




The Federation of  
Islamic Associations  
of New Zealand (Inc.)

اتحاد الجمعيات الإسلامية النيوزيلندية

# EVIDENCE BASED SYNTHESIS

THE SUBMISSION TO THE ROYAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE ATTACK ON CHRISTCHURCH MOSQUES





**The Federation of the Islamic Associations of New Zealand (FIANZ) is the national body of Muslims in New Zealand. It was established in 1979. The following are the constituent regional Associations of FIANZ:**

- New Zealand Muslim Association Incorporated (NZMA), Auckland
- South Auckland Muslim Association Incorporated (SAMA), Auckland
- Waikato Muslim Association Incorporated (WMA), Hamilton
- Manawatu Muslim Association Incorporated (MMA), Palmerston North
- The International Muslim Association of New Zealand Incorporated (IMAN), Wellington
- Muslim Association of Canterbury Incorporated (MAC), Christchurch
- Otago Muslim Association Incorporated (OMA), Dunedin

All enquiries should be directed to  
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# EVIDENCE BASED SYNTHESIS

## KARAKIA

Kia hora te marino  
Kia whakapapa pounamu te moana  
Hei huarahi mā tatou I te rangi nei  
Aroha atu, aroha mai  
Tātou i a tātou katoa.

May peace be widespread  
May the sea be like greenstone  
A pathway for us all this day  
Let us show respect for each other  
For one another  
Bind us all together !

EMERGENCY POLICE EMERGENCY POLICE EMERGENCY POLICE EMERGENCY POLICE





بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

In the name of Allāh, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful

## 1.0 INTRODUCTION

“...Be always just, that is nearer to righteousness...”

From Surat AL’Maidah, Al-Quran

This is our evidence-based synthesis of the submission.....

The tragedy which befell Aotearoa on 15 March, 2019 stirred the heartfelt sympathy and resilient spirit of New Zealanders. The unity and friendliness displayed from Cape Reinga to the South West Cape, was uniquely Kiwiana at its best. We shared the sorrow of the tragedy as a united and caring nation. Simply put, the terrorist lost. The esoteric divisions of ideologies, inclinations and identities were replaced by the iconic hugs of harmony. Strangers became friends and neighbours became family. Aotearoa became the land of “you are us”, Aroha Nui and Assalam Alaikum. Our national response made us the envy of the rest of the world.

It is in this context that we make this submission to The Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Attack on Christchurch Mosques. This context of coming together is not an historical aberration, but we believe is a fundamental trait of our nationhood which makes New Zealand unique. At the outset we would like to establish as a baseline that this submission is a continuation of the healing process for a nation in mourning.<sup>1</sup>

Our considered view is that, in a nation’s formative development process such tragedies whilst poignant, should nevertheless be spring-board pointers to lessons learned, so that future generations of Kiwis may endorse, enshrine and enjoy the multi-identity tapestry of the Kiwi cultural landscape.

<sup>1</sup> <https://fianz.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/ChCh-HealingProcess-sm.pdf>



# EVIDENCE BASED SYNTHESIS

The Royal Commission is what we had requested from the Government and we thank them for incorporating many of our suggestions in the Terms of Reference. Here we must also acknowledge the sincerity and open-arms approach of The Royal Commissioners and their Executive Officials. Their seriousness and devotion to ensure meaningful consultation with Muslims was quite evident. We have full confidence in the Royal Commission to determine the efficacy of our findings and the pertinence of our recommendations in their final report to the Government.

We do not purport to represent all the divergent views of the nearly 60,000 Muslims in New Zealand.<sup>2</sup> We know that many Muslim individuals, Associations and Trusts, have made their own submission to The Royal Commission. To us what is important is the submission content and the contribution it makes to the learning process, rather than who has made the submission. As such, we recognise there may be overlapping of information on the one hand as well as divergent viewpoints on the other. Both ensure a rich source of information for the Royal Commissioners and their Inquiry Report.

This submission is based on the combined team effort of young New Zealanders. This is a homogenous group committed to the nation-building of their homeland. They not only brought with them the skills, competence and aspiration to make a difference but also a wide variety of divergent views. This divergence has provided us with a rock bed foundation of strength. The same has been true when we went on a nationwide consultation and engagement programme from Dunedin to Auckland. It has been the plethora of views that made this journey part of the healing process and this submission so meaningful.

Abdur Razzaq  
Chairperson,  
FIANZ Submission to the Royal Commission  
info@fianz.com

24 February 2020

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<sup>3</sup> The number of Muslims in New Zealand according to the 2018 census is 57,276, up 24% from 46,149 in the 2013 census.



## 2.00 TERMS OF REFERENCE: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS

The issues we have sought to address in this section are related to 'Findings' and are based on the Terms of Reference

### **Matters upon which findings are sought**

The inquiry must report its findings on the following matters:

- (a) whether there was any information provided or otherwise available to relevant State sector agencies that could or should have alerted them to the attack and, if such information was provided or otherwise available, how the agencies responded to any such information, and whether that response was appropriate; and
- (b) the interaction amongst relevant State sector agencies, including whether there was any failure in information sharing between the relevant agencies; and
- (c) whether relevant State sector agencies failed to anticipate or plan for the attack due to an inappropriate concentration of counter-terrorism resources or priorities on other terrorism threats; and
- (d) whether any relevant State sector agency failed to meet required standards or was otherwise at fault, whether in whole or in part; and
- (e) any other matters relevant to the purpose of the inquiry, to the extent necessary to provide a complete report.

### **Scope of inquiry**

In order to achieve its purpose, the inquiry must inquire into—

- (a) the individual's activities before the attack, including—
  - (i) relevant information from his time in Australia; and
  - (ii) his arrival and residence in New Zealand; and
  - (iii) his travel within New Zealand, and internationally; and
  - (iv) how he obtained a gun licence, weapons, and ammunition; and
  - (v) his use of social media and other online media; and
  - (vi) his connections with others, whether in New Zealand or internationally; and
- (b) what relevant State sector agencies knew about this individual and his activities before the attack, what actions (if any) they took in light of that knowledge, and whether there were any additional measures that the agencies could have taken to prevent the attack; and
- (c) whether there were any impediments to relevant State sector agencies gathering or sharing information relevant to the attack, or acting on such information, including legislative impediments; and
- (d) whether there was any inappropriate concentration of, or priority setting for, counter-terrorism resources by relevant State sector agencies prior to the attack.

Source: Terms of Reference, The Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Attack on Christchurch Mosques



## 3.00 OUR LIMITATIONS

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We have deliberately termed this section as preliminary findings, since we recognise that we do not have access to all the facts and data which are required to respond to the Scope of the Inquiry .

A number of salient points should be noted in this context.

- Under the Official Information Act (OIA) members of the team sought information from a number of Government agencies. We were disappointed that some have yet to respond despite an inordinate amount of time given to them, whilst others shared some information but avoided many substantive and relevant questions.
- We also shared our questions with the Royal Commissioners and requested them to follow up with the agencies concerned. We believe many of the questions are very pertinent to the scope of the inquiry. This channel of communication and the opportunity to present our questions to the Commission was indicative of the respect given to us by the Commission and the sincerity with which they sought our input.
- We were however dismayed that a particular and important source of information on the web was redacted for inexplicable reasons. It related to a speech given by the former Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Cheryl Gwyn, on 1 July 2019 to the Rotary Club of Wellington . It is on the Rotary Club website as well on YouTube. Whilst most of the speech is available, from about the time she started speaking on the Christchurch attack and the oversight on the role of the SIS, her speech was redacted (from 15.52 minutes to 26.40 minutes of her speech) . Please see <https://rcw.org.nz/cheryl-gwyn---inspector-general-of-intelligence-and-security>. This matter was also brought to the attention of the Royal Commission. This is the first time we have seen the overt censorship of a public statement by a senior public servant. We are not sure as to who authorised this or why it was redacted. This type of censorship is most unusual in New Zealand.
- Our findings is based on either primary or secondary information sources. This is in part to ensure that our submission is evidence-based.



# EVIDENCE BASED SYNTHESIS

## 4.0 OUR ASSERTIONS BASED ON PRELIMINARY FINDINGS

### 4.1 Assertion 1

There is sufficient cause for concern in the manner in which the arms licence and ammunition was approved by the police. If the police had strictly followed the requirements of the Application for a New Zealand Firearms Licence (form POL67J) and analysed the information gained from the vetting process, the applicant would not have been granted an arms licence which subsequently enabled him to legally purchase the guns and ammunition used in the massacre of 51 people and the injuring 49 others.

### Evidence- Incorrect Completion of Application Form :

The application for a NZ Firearms Licence stipulates that two people need to verify the suitability to possess and use firearms. The following are the criteria for the two people :

One person "must be a spouse, partner or next of kin ( who normally resides with , or is related ..)"

The other person " must be a person who is unrelated ...and over 20 years of age and knows you well"

**NEW ZEALAND POLICE** Application for a New Zealand Firearms Licence (POL67J)

This application is for: **First time licence holder** / **Existing licence holder** / **Fee for:** **New licence/ licence before expiry \$126.50** / **Licence after expiry \$241.50**

Your licence number: [ ]

**Your personal details**

Surname, First & middle names, Maiden/other names used, Residential address, Gender (Male/Female), Date of birth, Place of birth, Home phone, Mobile phone, Postal address, Driver licence number, Occupation, Rural/rapid number, Work phone.

**Employer, school or educational facility details**

Business name, Employer/educational facility name, Position, Email, Daytime phone number.

**Two people who can verify your suitability to possess and use firearms**

**1. Must be a spouse, partner or next of kin (who normally resides with, or is related to you)**

Surname, First & middle names, Relationship, Residential address, Home phone, Firearms licence number if held, Mobile phone, Occupation, Gender (Male/Female), Date of birth, Work phone, Email, Drivers licence number.

**2. Must be a person who is unrelated to you and over 20 years of age and know you well**

Surname, First & middle names, Relationship, Residential address, Home phone, Firearms licence number if held, Mobile phone, Occupation, Gender (Male/Female), Date of birth, Work phone, Email, Drivers licence number.

**Declaration**

I declare that the information I have supplied for this application is true and correct. I understand that it is an offence to intentionally supply incorrect particulars or misleading details. I consent to the Police making inquiries into my fitness to possess or own a firearm and authorise any person approached by the Police in this matter to release or disclose all relevant information.

**Signature**

Applying Police member name, Station, Date application received, OD.

**Police use only**

The information you provide on this form is collected for the purpose of administration of the Arms Act 1983. NZ Police will hold, store, use or disclose the personal information collected in accordance with the provisions of the Privacy Act 1993. This means that, where necessary, NZ Police may use or disclose your personal information to enable it to carry out its lawful functions, including prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of offences. Please refer to the Privacy section of our website for more information. You will receive a letter telling you when you can start the firearms Safety Programme. The firearms Safety Programme theoretical testing and practical training is conducted on behalf of Police by third parties who will advise Police of your theoretical test result and when you have attended the practical training.

[www.police.govt.nz/advice/firearms-and-safety/new-zealand-firearms-licence](http://www.police.govt.nz/advice/firearms-and-safety/new-zealand-firearms-licence)





# EVIDENCE BASED SYNTHESIS

According to the Police, the applicant initially gave the name of a family member who was not a NZ resident.<sup>3</sup> The policy states a referee must be a resident of New Zealand, so new referees were requested.<sup>4</sup> By the Police's own admission they subsequently accepted the names of two referees provided by the applicant.<sup>5</sup> However a significant omission in the statement by the Police was that they did not receive the names of anyone who is related or normally resides with the applicant. This is a very important anomaly and one which needs careful checking by the RC. The form emphatically states that one of the referees must be a spouse, partner or next of kin .

The rationale for this 'compulsory' criteria is that "a person who normally resides with or is related' would be able to give background information on whether the applicant is 'fit and proper' ( as per the Arms Act 1983,Public Act, 1983 No 44)<sup>6</sup>. This essential interview of a relative or someone who normally resides with the applicant is a key qualification before the police progress to the next stage. It appears the Police by-passed their own stipulations. We request the RC to check this and examine what substantiation was given for this significant omission.

Not only did the Police fail to meet their own criteria with respect to the first referee, they also appear to have bypassed their own stipulations for the second referee. The latter has to be an unrelated person but one who "knows you (the applicant) well". The Police did not deny this and said they would clarify in due course, the claim by the former, policeman and Head of Firearms Control of NZ Police, Joe Green<sup>7</sup> that the two referees proposed by the applicant were from an 'on-line chat room'. As such, the question may be raised how could such persons 'know the applicant well'.

Specialist firearms lawyer Nicholas Taylor, who has several clients in the South, believed police work during the firearms application was not up to scratch. "Clearly there were problems with the vetting. There's all sorts of failures there." "This guy has had some sort of online presence for almost two years it seems and it was never looked at or checked on at all." Asked if he had ever heard of someone finding a referee online, his answer was unequivocal. "God, no."

<sup>3</sup> <https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/christchurch-shooting/111480472/gun-licence-approval-for-man-charged-with-christchurch-shooting-followed-correct-process>

<sup>4</sup> Ibid

<sup>5</sup> Ibid

<sup>6</sup> <http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1983/0044/37.0/whole.html>

<sup>7</sup> <https://fss.nz/joe-green/> and <https://www.odt.co.nz/news/national/rnz/ex-cop-gun-licence-obtained-without-proper-checks>



# EVIDENCE BASED SYNTHESIS

It has now been established, with no denial by the Police, that the two referees were a father and son who the applicant had met 'on-line' recently<sup>8</sup> and that both the father and the son gave identical responses , " almost exactly the same thing." <sup>.9</sup>

## Evidence – Inadequate Background Check :

It is mandated that there is a thorough background check by the Police of all applicants.<sup>10</sup> This is Step 5 of the process of acquiring a licence.

It is important to note the timeline of applicant with respect to his gun licence application.



<b>August 2017</b>	ARRIVAL in NZ <sup>11</sup>
<b>September 2017</b>	APPLICATION- Filed an application for a firearms licence in September 2017 in Dunedin. <sup>12</sup>
<b>October 2017</b>	INTERVIEW -The accused was interviewed at his home address in Dunedin. <sup>13</sup>  INSPECTION – Same day as above , a security inspection took place at the same time. <sup>14</sup>
<b>November 2017</b>	LICENCE - All the available information was reviewed and the licence was approved <sup>15</sup>
<b>December 2017</b>	FIRST GUN PURCHASE First gun sold by Gun City, the first of 4 guns from this outlet, <sup>16</sup> also a hunting rifle bought at Hunting & Fishing, an outdoor store in Dunedin in late 2017. Total - used an AR-15 when he was at the club. <sup>17</sup> two semiautomatic weapons and two shotguns <sup>18</sup>
<b>February 2018</b>	GUN CLUB Joined Bruce Rifle Club <sup>19</sup>
<b>March 2018</b>	PURCHASE GUN - Fourth gun sold by Gun City – But not the one used in the massacre <sup>20</sup>

8 <https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/new-zealand/2019/03/ex-police-firearms-manager-concerned-about-ease-of-alleged-christchurch-gunman-s-licence.html>  
9 <https://www.odt.co.nz/news/dunedin/failures-issuing-gun-licence>  
10 <https://www.police.govt.nz/sites/default/files/publications/firearms-application-form.pdf>  
11 <https://www.smh.com.au/national/white-bred-terrorist-the-making-of-a-killer-20190806-p52ee7.html>  
12 <https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/christchurch-shooting/111480472/gun-licence-approval-for-man-charged-with-christchurch-shooting-followed-correct-process>  
13 lbid  
14 lbid  
15 lbid  
16 <https://www.odt.co.nz/news/national/gun-city-sold-brenton-larrant-four-guns-and-ammunition>  
17 <https://www.newsroom.co.nz/2019/03/16/491834/shooter-trained-at-otago-gun-club>  
18 <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/03/zealand-terrorist-attack-suspect-grins-court-190316011147796.html>  
19 <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/18/world/asia/new-zealand-shooting-jacinda-ardern.html>  
20 lbid



# EVIDENCE BASED SYNTHESIS

The applicant had arrived in NZ merely one month earlier when he filed his application for a gun licence. It was a time when he had no known source of income, no employment, no friends or relatives in NZ (as per the application form), living in a flat he had rented barely three weeks earlier, and according to neighbours he was a loner with no known friends or relatives in Dunedin<sup>21</sup>, yet the NZ police had approved his background check. A cursory background check of prior criminal conviction is an insufficient baseline for a background check given the enormity of the potential harm of a firearm.

## EFFICACY OF NZ POLICE VETTING PROCESS

According to a recent report, despite background checks and vetting process, NZ Police had issued gun licences to 639 Australians who already had criminal convictions. Of the above who were granted gun licence, 37 went on to commit firearms crimes, including two homicides.

Source: : [https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c\\_id=1&objectid=12248182](https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=12248182)

More than 99 percent of people who apply for a firearms licence in New Zealand are successful, according to Police data.<sup>22</sup> In 2017, of the 43,509 firearm licence applications, just 188 applications were declined; a pass rate of 99.6 percent.<sup>23</sup>

## Evidence – Derisory Interviews:

The seventh stage of the application vetting process are interviews of the applicant and also the referees.

The police have claimed that they had interviewed the applicant at his home.<sup>24</sup> However a former Policeman and Head of Firearms Control, stated that the interview did not take place at the home of the applicant.<sup>25</sup> This needs to be verified by the RC as well what transpired during the interview.

**Application for a New Zealand Firearms Licence**

This application form is for all applicants for a New Zealand firearms licence (except visitors to New Zealand) whether you have previously held a firearms licence or not.

**7 Interviews and security check**

Police contact you to arrange an interview (during which we will also inspect your firearms security arrangements) after you complete the firearms practical training. We also interview your referees and complete any remaining enquiries.

21 <https://www.smh.com.au/national/white-bred-terrorist-the-making-of-a-killer-20190806-p52ee7.html>

22 <https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:0HW-IYSZLuJ:https://newsie.co.nz/news/144268-new-zealand-firearm-licence-applications-had-996-percent-pass-rate-2017.html+%&cd=26&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=nz&client=firefox-b-d>

23 <https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:0HW-IYSZLuJ:https://newsie.co.nz/news/144268-new-zealand-firearm-licence-applications-had-996-percent-pass-rate-2017.html+%&cd=26&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=nz&client=firefox-b-d>

24 <https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/christchurch-shooting/111480472/gun-licence-approval-for-man-charged-with-christchurch-shooting-followed-correct-process>

25 <https://www.msn.com/en-nz/news/national/christchurch-terror-attack-accuseds-gun-licence-obtained-without-proper-checks-former-police-officer/ar-BBV4H6Y>



# EVIDENCE BASED SYNTHESIS

During the interview, a few basic questions on his background and purpose for owning a gun would have revealed that:

- the applicant had just arrived in NZ (barely a month);
- he had no employment;
- no documented source of income;
- he did not have any friends and/or relatives in Dunedin (or anywhere in NZ)
- there was no indication that he wanted the gun for recreational purpose since he joined the gun club some six months later (in February 2018)
- nor did he have any history of recreational hunting
- nor did he have a hobby of gun collecting.

The above should have raised alarm bells as to the purpose of the applicant owning guns or at least some cause for concern as to whether the applicant was 'fit and proper' to own firearms.

By contrast, we compare in the inset the experience of a non-Caucasian in 2017 following a visit to a gun shop.<sup>26</sup>

In 2017, a Syrian gentleman visited a gun shop in Christchurch. He did not want to purchase a gun and was curious as to the different types of the guns on display. No one asked for, nor did he give his name or contact details. Yet the following day, the Police had tracked him down and interviewed him at his home as to the purpose of him visiting the gun shop.



ALL THE POSSESSIONS FROM THE RENTED HOUSE:  
Source: <https://www.smh.com.au/national/white-bred-terrorist-the-making-of-a-killer-20190806-p52ee7.html>

The interview of the applicant, according to the police, was conducted at his duplex rental property. The place was austere with a bed in the living room as the only furnishing.<sup>27</sup> His only possessions were a mattress and a black bookshelf, a colander and a dish rack, a few battered suitcases, a broken electric fan, a toaster and a worn vinyl computer chair.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>26</sup> Name has been withheld to maintain his confidentiality.

<sup>27</sup> [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia\\_pacific/hiding-in-plain-sight-in-quiet-new-zealand-city-alleged-gunman-plotted-carnage/2019/03/21/1846de9e-4a7b-11e9-8cfc-2c5d0999c21e\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/hiding-in-plain-sight-in-quiet-new-zealand-city-alleged-gunman-plotted-carnage/2019/03/21/1846de9e-4a7b-11e9-8cfc-2c5d0999c21e_story.html)

<sup>28</sup> <https://www.smh.com.au/national/white-bred-terrorist-the-making-of-a-killer-20190806-p52ee7.html>



# EVIDENCE BASED SYNTHESIS

According to the police, he had made provision for arms security at the rental premises with the permission of the landlord. That the applicant seemed to have given more priority to the purchase, possession and storage of a firearm and also a security arms cabinet rather than to the basic essentials of the home should have raised some alarm bells. Moreover why would a recent arrival and unemployed man, who does not have a history of hunting, nor arms collecting and who does not belong to any gun club, spend hundreds of dollars to purchase guns and also a gun-storage safe ?

With respect to the matter of interviewing the two referees, it has been revealed that they :

- were from a recently created on-line chat room
- had not met the applicant in person
- were New Zealanders ( Note: It can be presumed that the applicant would have known them for only a short time, since he arrived only 1 month earlier)
- were father and son
- gave the same answer to the questions

## COULD THEY BE THE SAME ON-LINE CHAT ROOM 'FATHER AND SON' WHO WERE REFEREES OF THE APPLICANT

In an investigation by a TV 1 reporter, it was learned that there is an on-line presence of a 'father and son', who are white supremacist neo- Nazis and who are getting ready for a "NS [National Socialism] revolt to begin".

Source:<https://www.tvnz.co.nz/one-news/new-zealand/neo-nazi-website-hack-reveals-far-right-users-in-new-zealand-young-15>

It seems quite illogical that based on the reference from the above two people that the Police were able to conclude that the applicant was a 'fit and proper' person to own firearms. This is quite contrary to the fire arms licence application form ( POL67J) which requires a spouse or family member who had resided with the applicant, and a friend who knows the applicant well to vouchsafe that the person is 'fit and proper' to own a firearms licence. An Australian News reporter mentioned that the applicant was considered by some as an "an intense guy who had issues with minorities, particularly immigrants and women". A doctor said he also had "some issue with his mother".<sup>29</sup> Whilst the above would have been unknown to the Police at the time of the application, it nevertheless highlights the importance of interviewing the family and friends of the applicant (as per the Application Form requirement). The strict requirements should not have been bypassed nor exceptions made under any circumstance. After all the issuing of an arms licence is a serious matter.



# EVIDENCE BASED SYNTHESIS

## Evidence: No Probing of Purchase of a Large Inventory of High Calibre Bullets Applicable Mainly for Modified Semi-Automatic Guns

The firm which sold four of the 5 guns categorically stated, "We didn't sell him the rifle used in the incident. I watched the video and saw the rifle... and it was not from any Gun City affiliated store."<sup>30</sup> The question is raised how and who modified the guns, given that the applicant had no background in arms modification. Experts have suggested that the rifle used in the massacre was illegally converted by inserting a high capacity magazine. This significantly increased the number of rounds that could have been fired without reloading and replacing the magazine.<sup>31</sup> The police also confirmed that the gun was modified.<sup>32</sup>

The purchase of the 7.62x39 high calibre bullets, which are mainly used in military style semi-automatic rifles, should have raised alarms, or at least a cursory check by the police as to the purpose of many bullets for a person who did not even belong to a gun club at the time. Purchase of 2000 rounds of bullets by an unemployed person, who had just arrived in NZ, with no relatives or close friends to vouchsafe that he was 'fit and proper'. The purchase of the bullets at an estimated cost of \$800 by a person who was unemployed seems a significant oversight by the Police. The purchase was signed off by a NZ Police Arms Officer.

**New Zealand Police** Mail Order Sales of Standard Sporting Firearm(s), Airgun(s) and/or Ammunition Revision 11/2016

**NZ Police Mail Order Sales - Section 43A, Arms Act, 1983** Application date: 07 12 17

**SECTION 1 - PURCHASER TO FILL IN ALL RELEVANT DETAILS IN THIS SECTION**

**SELLER / SUPPLIER:**  
 Surname: MCNEILL Forename(s): PAUL  
 Date of birth if not a licence holder: Phone No: 038843883  
 Business name: AORAKI AMMUNITION COMPANY LTD Email: SALES@AORAKIAMMO.CO.NZ  
 Firearms Licence No: T6197042 Expiry date: 09/06/2018

Quantity	Description (e.g. Rifle)	Make	Model	Calibre	Serial Number
/					

**AMMUNITION:**

Type of firearm(s) the ammunition will be used in	No. of boxes	No. rounds per box	Quantity	Type	Calibre
Norinco SRC	1	1820	1820	7.62x39	7.62
Winham armoury SRC	1	1000	1000	223 35gr FMJ	223

**PURCHASER DETAILS:**  
 Surname: TARRANT Forename(s): Brenton Harrison  
 Purchaser's delivery address: 112 Somerville Street, Dunedin, 9013. Sellers reference or Invoice No:  
 (For firearms, must be licence holder's, courier, Mail Co, or Firearms Dealer's address only) Date:  
 The above address is my own:  Courier:  Mail Co:  Firearms Dealer:  You may append pages to this application if they fit in the provided room.  
 Phone No: 0275319210 Email: btarrant233@hotmail.com  
 Firearms Licence No: T5130424 Expiry date: 19 09 27  
 Date of birth if not a licence holder: Purchaser's signature: [Signature]

**PROOF OF AGE:** Required when purchasing an airgun and do not have a firearms licence  
 Drivers licence No: Expiry date:  Letter of support from Airguns Club attached, if purchasing restricted airgun from licensed firearms dealer  
 Other NZ Government issued photo ID Document attached Issue No: Expiry date:

**SECTION 2 - POLICE USE - POLICE MEMBER RECEIVING APPLICATION**  
 Seller's ID verified  Ammunition correct  Receiving Officer signature and stamp: [Stamp] PENNAN PUFFESO 7 12 17  
 Licence signed and correct (SEA checked)  Licence and IDA checked  Signature and date: [Signature]


**SECTION 3 - POLICE USE - TRANSACTION AUTHORIZATION BY ARMS OFFICER**  
 I have inspected both the Seller's and Purchaser's Firearms Licence records for relevant identification records where this application relates to airgun purchased and I am satisfied that he/she is a fit and proper person to purchase the Firearm(s), Airgun(s) and/or Ammunition listed herein.  
 Member of Police: L.M. BUTCHER Email: [Email] Designation: Arms Officer  
 I have called direct to seller  or called direct to seller  Authorisation expiry date: 11-12-2017  
 Original purchaser order attached (if relevant)  Copy of this application (and purchase order) filed  Approving Police Employee signature or stamp and date: [Signature] 11-12-2017

30 <https://www.odt.co.nz/news/national/gun-city-sold-brenton-tarrant-four-guns-and-ammunition>  
31 [https://d3n8a8pro7vhm.cloudfront.net/fairandreasonable/mailings/26/attachments/original/COLFO\\_-\\_Royal\\_Commission\\_Submission\\_FINAL.pdf?1568190529](https://d3n8a8pro7vhm.cloudfront.net/fairandreasonable/mailings/26/attachments/original/COLFO_-_Royal_Commission_Submission_FINAL.pdf?1568190529)  
32 <https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/111337333/christchurch-shooting-guns-used-in-attack-were-modified-says-pm>



# EVIDENCE BASED SYNTHESIS

## POSSIBLE EXPLANATION : NZ POLICE OVERSIGHT IN THIS



FIANZ considers the services provided by the NZ Police in the aftermath of the 15 March massacre as world-class and exemplary. By all accounts our friends in blue were an example to police forces around the world.<sup>33</sup>

In this context and given the on-going close support of the Maori, Pacific and Ethnic Services (MPES) of the NZ Police, we are reticent to raise any issue which may have an impact on the reputation of the NZ Police as a whole. The valuable lesson here is the importance of the ethnic liaison officers and having a role in place at a senior level in Police National Headquarters to ensure of ethnic community voice and priorities are not lost. We note that prior to and subsequent to the Christchurch attacks that the roles of the Christchurch Ethnic liaison officers were not filled and that there was no ethnic liaison officer in Dunedin. The ethnic advisory board in Christchurch had also not met for an extended period of time. In 2016 government had also approved the appointment of 20 new Ethnic liaison officers across police but these roles were not fully implemented in all police districts and in some cases amended to be utilised for other non-ethnic communities. It is our hope that all police districts have ethnic liaison officers at a consistent management rank and all police districts have ethnic advisory boards. The MPES policing group requires a significant investment of resource to ensure parity with other parts of police. The concern for us is not related to the credibility and confidence that we have on our in the NZ Police but rather systemic inadequacies and anomalies related to priorities which may have been significant contributory factors.



In terms of resources, the NZ Police themselves stated their deprioritisation of arms licensing services: “Due to increased demand in other Police priority areas, fewer resources have been available for firearms licensing activities in the 2017/18 year. To address this, Police have recently implemented a firearms administration modernisation programme that will contribute to improving our performance in this area.”<sup>34</sup>

Source: NZ Police Annual Report 2017/18.

What is also important to note in this context is that the performance criteria relates only to “pistol endorsement holder investigated” and “timeliness of firearms licence renewals”.<sup>35</sup> There is no mention of Type A or Type E arms licence holders being investigated, nor of matching the type of ammunition sold to the type of licence, or other such important performance criteria.

With respect to training, whilst there has been an increase in the number of constabulary from previous years, there was a marginal reduction in the amount of investment made in police training.<sup>36</sup> In the year 2016/17, \$3.13million was invested in training but this reduced to \$3.06 million for the year 2017/2018, yet the number of constabulary increased from 8,834 to 9,107 during the same period.<sup>37</sup> With crime prevention being one of the six key pillars of the NZ Police<sup>38</sup>, the importance of training would have been quite obvious. It is a serious concern that the Royal New Zealand Police College structure does not have a dedicated Ethnic Trainer in place at a senior rank. The provision of training on religion and ethnic community issues appears to be very ad hoc. The Ethnic diversity and the ranks of trainers also appear to be disproportionately mono cultural. It is quite a serious matter of concern, that there are no objective measures in any of the Police reports regarding the technical expertise of NZ Police Arms Officers who are at the front line when it comes to the vetting of applications. This was highlighted in a recent case where the NZ Police had to reinstate an arms licence after losing a court case.<sup>39</sup>

Violent extremism, like the massacre carried out on March 15, has been one of the six top threats to New Zealand and countering such extremism has been a ‘high intelligence priority’ since 2015<sup>40</sup>. The NZ Police always had a role in the Domestic and External Security Coordination (DESC) system, which is now more generally referred to as the National Security System. They also have a pivotal functional role in the Cabinet National Security Committee (NSC). At an operational level the NZ Police are also part of various national security related boards and committees, including the Security and Intelligence Board (SIB) and the Counter-Terrorism Coordinating Committee (CTCC) as well as the National Intelligence Coordination Committee (NICC).

34 <https://www.police.govt.nz/sites/default/files/publications/annual-report-2017-2018.pdf>

35 <https://www.police.govt.nz/sites/default/files/publications/annual-report-2017-2018.pdf>

36 <https://www.police.govt.nz/sites/default/files/publications/annual-report-2017-2018.pdf>

37 <https://www.police.govt.nz/sites/default/files/publications/annual-report-2017-2018.pdf>

38 <https://www.police.govt.nz/sites/default/files/publications/annual-report-2017-2018.pdf>

39 <https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/115000222/private-investigator-clinton-bowman-has-won-back-his-firearms-licence-after-it-was-revoked-by-police>

40 [https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c\\_id=1&objectid=12213968](https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=12213968)

41 <https://www.police.govt.nz/sites/default/files/publications/ir-01-19-7578.pdf>





# EVIDENCE BASED SYNTHESIS

Yet it is perplexing that as a result of an Official Information Act (OIA) request, the NZ Police stated that , “there is no specific offence of extremism and reports of such are not recorded in the Police system in structured fields. Therefore, questions about reports received by Police about white supremacist extremism, neo-nazi extremism, and other forms of extremism, and whether they were about firearms licence holders are refused in accordance with section 18(f)...”<sup>41</sup>. That the NZ Police do not record such information seems quite at odds with the Government’s high intelligence priority of countering violent extremism. It is most disturbing that only after the March 15 massacre, did the NZ Police take a lead on investigating right-wing extremism, including the arrest of a NZ army soldier.<sup>42</sup>

The National Security Counter Terrorism Group (NSCTG) also known as National Security and Intelligence Threats (NSIT) in Police oversees national security and threats in New Zealand. This group has emphasised the importance of community engagement and have strong partnerships in the community to address threats to New Zealand. The actions of this group has not been demonstrated to the Muslim community. This is group, under the guise of building relationships actually uses the intelligence to target the community. In community meetings held over the years and in recent times, representatives of FIANZ and the IWCNZ have been introduced to members of the group and found that they have had no relationship with them. This police group has lobbied for additional resources for community engagement but this runs counter productive to their actual intent and actions demonstrated to date.

We believe that community engagement resources should not be allocated to a group that uses the information to unfairly target minority communities. Any additional resources for community engagement should be provided to police groups that have the trust and confidence of minority communities, who have the cultural and linguistic expertise and the experience and relationships.

FIANZ worked with the police MPES group to establish a programme to assist young people who were at risk called the Young Peoples Intervention Programme. This programme was also supported by the Ministry of Social Development and included the police NSCTG. This programme successfully assisted several youth because it included a strong community representation. Since 2018 FIANZ has now been excluded from this group and the NCTG has renamed this group and it currently only consists of government agencies. We believe that the actions of the police NCSTG is counter productive to genuine community engagement. We believe the group should 'stick to its knitting' and leave community engagement to other police groups as outlined above.

42 <https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/405784/soldier-s-arrest-raises-concerns-far-right-could-infiltrate-defence-force>  
43 <https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/118389380/firearms-buyback--more-than-56000-firearms-handed-in>



# EVIDENCE BASED SYNTHESIS

A disturbing aspect of the orientation of Police staff in relation to violent extremism, has been the focus on Islam and Muslim and the exclusion White-Supremacists or Right Wing Extremists. We have sought details of these orientation sessions, which we understand were given by a member of the Police intelligence staff and were mainly a negative portrayal of both Islam and Muslims. These presentations were also provided to other government agencies including SIS and Corrections and had no community input. We have sought copies of the Powerpoint of these sessions under the OIA. Post 15 March, we understand, this intelligence officer is now delivering another series of presentations to police leaders, staff and agency partners with a more sympathetic view of Islam but again with no community input. We would request the RC to further into this matter.

## **It is never too late....**

**It is noted that some 9 months after the massacre, the Police in response to the recent buy back scheme made a profound and solemn admission:**

**"We have to be better at administering the [Arms] Act,"<sup>43</sup>**

**Deputy Commissioner, NZ Police ( 21 December 2019)**



## 4.2 Assertion 2

Oversight by the Police, Immigration and Customs with respect to the Racist Right-Wing Advocating Terrorist (RRAT) may be considered a systemic dysfunction arising from the non-prioritisation of the threats posed by Racist Right Wing Extremism/Terrorism. .

Our Government agencies responsible for national security are one of the most efficacious in the world and NZ is a safe country as a result of the hard and diligent work of professionals in these agencies. The Police, Immigration and Customs are leading agencies who have an impressive record in this respect.

The March 15 act of terrorism has highlighted significant systemic dysfunction which contributed to the misapprehension of the above three agencies. The Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) has outlined 16 national priorities, including that of terrorism.



## 1. Systemic Dysfunction : Operational Reticence of NZ Police to Investigate Right Wing Extremists/Terrorists Prior to 15 March

### Evidence :

Whilst there is evidence of high priority operational response to threats posed by 'Muslim extremists', there is no evidence of any meaningful Police awareness of, or response to, threats posed by Racist Right-Wing Extremists/Terrorists prior to 15 March. The following are evidential examples of this dysfunctional approach.




# EVIDENCE BASED SYNTHESIS

## NZ POLICE RESPONSE TO PERCEIVED MUSLIM EXTREMIST THREAT

An Asian person with a beard and wearing a turban was sitting in a café in Auckland with his headphone on and with headphone wires sticking out of his backpack. A member of the public rang the police suspecting a bomb. 2 police officers arrived within 20 minutes. The person was a Sikh medical student not a Muslim extremist.<sup>44</sup>


Indicative of how seriously police take issues related to perceived Muslim extremist threats.



## NZ POLICE RESPONSE TO PERCEIVED RACIST RIGHT WING EXTREMIST THREAT (PRIOR TO 15 MARCH 2019)

A former NZ army machine gunner who visited the Bruce Gun Club where the Mosque terrorist trained, says he was deeply troubled by its Right Wing, neo-Nazi, advocating of violence and lodged a complaint with the Dunedin Police Arms Officer. "They're just a bunch of silly old duffers... it's nothing to worry about", was the alleged comment by the Arms Officer. No follow up was done.<sup>45</sup>

The complaint was not taken seriously and simply rebuffed according to the former NZ Defence Force staff



## NZ POLICE RESPONSE TO PERCEIVED RACIST RIGHT WING EXTREMIST THREAT (AFTER 15 MARCH 2019)

Television 1 News showed police visiting a Wellington home to accuse the occupants of distributing anti-Muslim material, following complaints from the public.<sup>46</sup>

Post March 15 March, the NZ Police seem to have started taking these issues more seriously.



Example 1

44 <https://www.tvnz.co.nz/one-news/new-zealand/police-called-on-auckland-sikh-over-headphone-cable-bomb-in-bag>

45 <https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/111336647/we-dont-breed-mass-killers-accused-christchurch-shooters-gun-club>

46 <https://www.tvnz.co.nz/one-news/new-zealand/family-says-rights-have-been-infringed-police-crack-down-distribution-offensive-material>



# EVIDENCE BASED SYNTHESIS

## NZ POLICE RESPONSE TO PERCEIVED MUSLIM EXTREMIST THREAT

An imam in a Mosque in Auckland was kept under police surveillance for potential terrorist allegiances. He had committed no crime other than having a name similar to a person on a US watch list. He is also alleged to have been involved in "extremist preaching". He was never charged or prosecuted.<sup>47</sup>

Alleged extreme preaching, a similar name to someone on a US wanted list. He was never charged nor prosecuted but was under NZ Police surveillance.



## NZ POLICE RESPONSE TO PERCEIVED RACIST RIGHT WING EXTREMIST THREAT (PRIOR TO 15 MARCH 2019)

A gunsmith living and working in Canterbury says he told police less than six months ago they needed to look at the rise of white supremacists with guns in Christchurch. He said that he spoke to the Acting Superintendent (name withheld) of the NZ Police at a public forum and warned him that the supremacists were purchasing arms. The AS could not recollect the conversation and made no note of the warning.<sup>48</sup>

The risks posed by Right Wing extremists were simply not in the purview of the NZ Police, even at the senior level.



## NZ POLICE RESPONSE TO PERCEIVED RACIST RIGHT WING EXTREMIST THREAT (AFTER 15 MARCH 2019)

A Christchurch teenager was arrested after Friday's Mosque shooting for allegedly inciting racial or ethnic hatred. A court document said the teen had intended to "excite hostility or ill-will" against people in New Zealand on the grounds of colour, race, ethnic or national origins by publishing written material, which is insulting.<sup>49</sup>

Another example of Police now responding to racist incitement.



## Example 2

<sup>47</sup> [https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c\\_id=1&objectid=11260760](https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11260760)

<sup>48</sup> <https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/385131/mosque-attacks-christchurch-gunsmith-warned-for-enticing-racial-or-ethnic-hate>

<sup>49</sup> <https://www.stuff.co.nz/the-press/news/111394495/christchurch-man-arrested-for-enticing-racial-or-ethnic-hate>



# EVIDENCE BASED SYNTHESIS

It is regrettable that police responses to Racist Right Wing Extremists have been noticeable to some extent only after the 15 March terror attack. However these responses have not been consistent and indicate an adhoc and inconsistent approach. This is particularly worrying given the lack of follow up by Police to genuine cases of abuse and threats such as those suffered by Muslim women, even after formal complaints were made.

In June 2019 Philip Arps was sentenced for sharing the Christchurch Mosque attacks videos. While this Sentencing was welcomed, he was released after serving one third of his sentence. In sharp contrast the Muslim member who was sentenced for copying and sharing objectionable material was sentenced in June 2016 for 3 years and 9 months. He was also denied parole repeatedly compared to ARPS who received it after serving a third. Police detailed having monitored and engaged with the Muslim community member for years monitoring his behaviour and offending yet ARPS was also active for many years and even driving around openly promoting white supremacy ideology through his business and interactions with no police action. The Police NSCT and SIS groups focused their resources on the Muslim community and hence gathered more evidence. Yet they were absent in looking for threats in other groups. It eventually fell to the community to develop programmes to help their own that got the Muslim person released. There were no formal programmes for rehabilitation that the Department of Corrections had for him.

Example 1: <sup>50</sup>

The screenshot shows a news article on the Stuff website. The page header includes the 'stuff' logo and a navigation menu with 'national' and 'crime' categories. The article title is 'Islamic women's group surprised by slow police response after threats'. The author is David Williams of Newsroom.co.nz, dated 09:10, Nov 29 2019. The article text states: 'Harassment, vitriol, and threats against Muslims are approaching the level of before the March 15 attack, an Islamic leader says. An Islamic women's group threatened online is surprised by the slow police response. Aliya Danzeisen, of the Islamic Women's Council, says it has been more than a month since she reported a threat made against her group on social media.'

Example 2: <sup>51</sup>

The screenshot shows a news article on the NZ Herald website. The page header includes the 'nzherald.co.nz' logo and 'HOME' text. The article title is 'Muslim sisters distraught after being verbally abused at Mt Albert train station'. The date is 17 Mar, 2019 2:40pm and it is noted as '3 minutes to read'. The article text states: 'Some 9 months after the racist abuse and despite police knowing the man who committed this, there has been no follow-up.'

50 <https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/crime/117806051/islamic-womens-group-surprised-by-slow-police-response-after-threats>

51 [https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c\\_id=1&objectid=12213536](https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=12213536)

<https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/crime/119112540/white-supremacist-philip-arps-to-be-released-from-prison>

[https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c\\_id=1&objectid=12168359](https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=12168359)



## 2. System Dysfunction: Operational Reticence of NZ Immigration and Customs to Investigate Right Wing Extremists/Terrorists Prior to 15 March

### Evidence :

FIANZ acknowledges that our border officials, particularly Customs and Immigration, play a pivotal role in keeping our homeland safe. Their dedication and professionalism are beyond reproach. Over the last decade we have also appreciated their willingness to consult, cooperate and communicate with the Muslim community. It is in this context of overall goodwill that it is disappointing to note that despite the assurances of the Auckland Airport Customs Operations Manager that profiling does not take place of Muslims,<sup>52</sup> FIANZ has ample counter evidence.

While researching for this submission, the FIANZ research team met with a former Customs official who stated that there was profiling of Muslims or those with Muslim sounding names and that given the ethics involved, the person has since resigned and declined to be identified for this submission. It should be noted that the information was revealed in front of at least a dozen persons.

Auckland Airport seems to be the most consistent place where Muslims have an identity change to become “Mr or Ms Random”.

Detailed examples were provided on the modus of profiling and is corroborated by the personal experience of many members of the NZ Muslim community, including members of our own research team who were ‘selected randomly’ for questioning by Customs officials. FIANZ has no evidence of any official policy related to systemic profiling but too many members of the Muslim community (males, females, recent migrants and those who have been citizens for decades, adults and elderly, various nationalities and all sharing a Muslim name) have all had similar experiences,<sup>53</sup> for this to be just ad hoc or coincidence. Auckland Airport seems to be the most consistent place where Muslims have an identity change and become “Mr or Ms Random”. Enquiries as to the purpose of visiting a select list of countries (see below) is the consistent question for almost all Mr and Ms Muslim Random.

Muslims Visiting the following countries:  
Pakistan, Jordan, Turkey, Syria, Dubai, Saudi Arabia, Palestine, Iraq, Somalia, Kuwait and Iran

COUNTRIES OF MOST INTEREST TO NZ BORDER OFFICIALS

52 <https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/307416/%27i-just-felt-like-i-was-a-criminal-%27>  
53 <https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/307416/%27i-just-felt-like-i-was-a-criminal-%27>



# EVIDENCE BASED SYNTHESIS

It is our contention that prior to 15 March, the border officials from Customs and Immigration did not prioritise the threat posed by Racist Right Wing Extremism. As such they were not aware of the countries of interest for Right Wing Extremists similar to the list of countries they had for Muslims.

Right Wing Extremists/Terrorists Visiting the following countries: Bulgaria, Bosnia, Serbia, Croatia, Hungary, Austria, Cyprus

SHOULD BE COUNTRIES OF MOST INTEREST TO NZ BORDER OFFICIALS

Some of the reasons why these countries are popular destinations for right wing extremists:

## Bulgaria

Only in one country in Europe that the Far Right has managed to enter government. The United Patriots, a coalition of Valeri Simeonov's National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria, NFSB, Krasimir Karakachanov's Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation, VMRO, and Volen Siderov's ATAKA now hold significant ministerial posts – responsible for defence, the economy, and the environment.



Far-right march in Sofia to honor pro-Nazi General Hristo Lukov.

## Bosnia

Many sites where Far Right Christian Serbs massacred Muslims. For instance, Višegrad was the site of some of the worst atrocities that took place. Over the course of one summer in 1992, as many as 3,000 Muslims were shot, raped, and drowned in this historic town along the banks of the Drina River.

The memory of the genocide committed against its Muslims has become a source of inspiration for the global far right.<sup>54</sup>



A grave in in Višegrad, to Muslim genocide victims





# EVIDENCE BASED SYNTHESIS

## Serbia

Serbia holds a special place in the far-right narrative in Europe, its loss of majority-Albanian Kosovo in a 1998-99 war held up as a case study of the 'Islamic colonisation' of 'Christian land', threatened anew, they say, since 2015 with the flow of mainly Muslim migrants and refugees from the Middle East, Africa and Asia to Europe's shores.<sup>55</sup>



Rise of far-right in Serbia

## Croatia

Franjo Tuđman, 27-year-old leader of the far-right Generation of Renovation Party, is charismatic and has a large following . Since 2008 he has also been involved in Croatian Pure Party of Rights, HCSP, the only far-right party that has managed to join the mainstream in Croatian politics and whose members are councillors in local municipalities. This makes Croatia a 'success' story for the far right.



Far Right openly parade in the capital Zagreb

Extensive Travel by the RRAT– He visited almost all the Far Right Popular Destinations

October 2016

Turkey, Israel granted a 90-day visa. He stayed 9 days.

December 2016

Bulgaria, Serbia, Bosnia, Montenegro, and Croatia<sup>56</sup>

Early 2017

Travelled to many European countries<sup>57</sup> France, Spain and Portugal<sup>58</sup>

August 2017

Arrived in NZ<sup>59</sup>

June 2018

Visited Australia for Sister's birthday<sup>60</sup>

Oct/Nov 2018

Pakistan , Bulgaria, North Korea and European Countries incl Austria

55 <https://balkaninsight.com/2019/11/19/young-patriots-serbias-role-in-the-european-far-right/>  
 56 <https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/chch-terror/384860/alleged-mosque-shooter-s-recent-travels-outside-nz>  
 57 <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/18/world/asia/new-zealand-shooting-jacinda-ardern.html>  
 58 <https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/chch-terror/384860/alleged-mosque-shooter-s-recent-travels-outside-nz>  
 59 <https://www.smh.com.au/national/white-bred-terrorist-the-making-of-a-killer-20190806-p52ee7.html>  
 60 <https://www.smh.com.au/national/white-bred-terrorist-the-making-of-a-killer-20190806-p52ee7.html>



# EVIDENCE BASED SYNTHESIS

## NEW ZEALAND PASSENGER ARRIVAL CARD

Information collected on this form and during the arrival process is sought to administer Customs, Immigration, Biosecurity, Border Security, Health, Wildlife, Police, Fine Enforcement, Justice, Benefits, Social Service, Electoral, Inland Revenue, and Currency laws. The information is authorised by legislation and will be disclosed to agencies administering and entitled to receive it under New Zealand law. This includes for purposes of data matching between those agencies. Once collected, information may be used for statistical purposes by Statistics New Zealand.

- This Arrival Card is a legal document – false declarations can lead to penalties including confiscation of goods, fines, prosecution, imprisonment, and deportation from New Zealand.
- A separate Arrival Card must be completed for each passenger, including children.
- Please answer in English and fill in BOTH sides.
- Print in capital letters like this: NEW ZEALAND or mark answers like this:

Occupation or job

3 List the countries you have been in during the past 30 days:

A cursory check would have raised issues of how an unemployed person can go on holiday travel to so many countries and so frequently.

If Customs & Immigration had made Far Right Extremism a priority concern then ..... Countries listed in Arrival Card would have alerted Customs & Immigration

The London based, Institute for Strategic Dialogue based on their comprehensive research, have noted that Europe's new far right is showing a keen interest in travelling to destinations such as the Balkans and certain European countries like Austria. This is particularly the case for those known as "Identitarians", who believe Europe is under attack by Muslims who seek to displace them in their "traditional lands" via "outbreeding" and immigration".<sup>61</sup> During one of his many overseas trip , the RRAT visited Austria, home of Martin Sellner, a 30-year-old Identitarian leader.<sup>62</sup>

Prior to settling in NZ , the RRAT visited Israel, Bulgaria, Serbia, Bosnia, Montenegro, and Croatia.<sup>63</sup> Whilst he lived in NZ, he also went overseas including to Pakistan, Bulgaria, North Korea and many European countries including Austria.<sup>64</sup> Many of these countries are popular destinations for Far Right extremists as part of their orientation.<sup>65</sup> The NZ border officials were not aware of the threats posed by Racist Right Wing Extremists and as such ignored tell-tale signs such as :

- Frequent visits to countries popular for Right Wing Extremists
- Inconsistency stemming from an unemployed person going on expensive overseas holiday trips to Europe and Asia

61 <https://www.smh.com.au/national/white-bred-terrorist-the-making-of-a-killer-20190806-p52ee7.html>  
 62 <https://www.smh.com.au/national/white-bred-terrorist-the-making-of-a-killer-20190806-p52ee7.html>  
 63 <https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/chch-terror/384860/alleged-mosque-shooter-s-recent-travels-outside-nz>  
 64 <https://www.smh.com.au/national/white-bred-terrorist-the-making-of-a-killer-20190806-p52ee7.html>  
 65 <https://www.smh.com.au/national/white-bred-terrorist-the-making-of-a-killer-20190806-p52ee7.html>



## PRELIMINARY CONCLUSION : WITH RESPECT TO THE NZ POLICE AND BORDER OFFICIALS ( CUSTOMS AND IMMIGRA-

### **Matters upon which findings are sought**

The inquiry must report its findings on the following matters:

- (a) whether there was any information provided or otherwise available to relevant State sector agencies that could or should have alerted them to the attack and, if such information was provided or otherwise available, how the agencies responded to any such information, and whether that response was appropriate; and
- (b) the interaction amongst relevant State sector agencies, including whether there was any failure in information sharing between the relevant agencies; and
- (c) whether relevant State sector agencies failed to anticipate or plan for the attack due to an inappropriate concentration of counter-terrorism resources or priorities on other terrorism threats; and
- (d) whether any relevant State sector agency failed to meet required standards or was otherwise at fault, whether in whole or in part; and
- (e) any other matters relevant to the purpose of the inquiry, to the extent necessary to provide a complete report.

In response to (a) above , the NZ Police was fully aware of the RRAT as per

- the gun application,
- the vetting process,
- the interviews of him and his referees
- the inspection of his home
- the approval to purchase large quantities of ammunition

It is our view that given the non-prioritisation of the threat posed by Racist Right Wing Extremists/-Terrorists, the NZ Police did not analyse the information they had until the tragic events of 15 March. This was not due to any deliberate oversight, but in our opinion due to systemic dysfunction , particularly failure of keeping front line Police informed of the national security and intelligence priorities and the threat posed by Racist Right Wing Extremists/Terrorist (RRAT).

It is also our view that our Border Officials, Customs and Immigration, were more focussed on profiling Muslims or those with Muslim names who had visited certain countries, and totally ignored the threat posed by Racist Right Wing Extremists/ Terrorists . The latter was a result of systemic dysfunction, similar to the Police , particularly the failure of keeping the front line Border Officials informed of the national security and intelligence priorities.

In making the above conclusions, we concur with ‘ c ’ above, that the Police, and Border Officials (Customs and Immigration) did not anticipate any acts of violence from RRAT, since their focus was mainly on Muslims.

We do not believe that ‘fault’(‘d’ above) is relevant in this context, since this was a systemic dysfunction, primarily as a result of non-communication of national security and intelligence priorities to the front line Police and Border Officials (Customs and Immigration)



## A FEW UNRESOLVED ISSUES – MOST PERTINENT TO THE NARRATIVE

1. As a self-avowed identitarian , who subscribes to the view that Muslims migrants are ‘taking over’ cities at the expense of Europeans, it seems most unusual that the RRAT chose Dunedin as a destination to settle in for this act of terrorism. Dunedin does not have many migrants, nor a visible Muslim community neighbourhood, and only one Islamic centre near the University. This was a meticulously planned massacre and the initial choice of Dunedin is incongruous to this planning.

2. Within 4 days of arrival from a large and cosmopolitan city like Melbourne, to a small city in NZ, he managed to secure a rental duplex accommodation and also provided a reference to secure the flat.<sup>66</sup> A loner who apparently knew no one in NZ but who had a readymade reference to give to the property manager seems rather unusual

3. The BBC confirmed the following email conversation between Martin Sellner, the Identitarian leader in Austria and the RRAT:

"If you ever come to Vienna, we have to go for a coffee or a beer," Sellner wrote.

"The same is true for you if you ever come to Australia or New Zealand," he replied .

"We have people in both countries who would like to welcome you to their home."<sup>67</sup>

This is one of a few occasions where “we’ has been used by the RRAT but more importantly the reference to “ we have people” in Australia and NZ , seems unusual given the narrative we have been told by the NZ authorities that he was a ‘lone wolf’.<sup>68</sup> This narrative needs to be investigated further.

4. In 2018 , the RRAT made a donation of €1500<sup>69</sup> to Martin Sellner in Austria. At that time the RRAT was living in NZ and if a NZ bank was used to send the funds then all bank transfers require ( compulsory) the full physical address of the beneficiary, without which funds cannot be transferred. The question may be posed, that NZ has some of the strictest banking anti-money laundering protocols, why then was it not picked up that funds were being sent to a well know Racist Far Right hate monger, someone who has been permanently banned from entry to the UK?<sup>70</sup>

66 [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia\\_pacific/hiding-in-plain-sight-in-quiet-new-zealand-city-alleged-gunman-plotted-carnage/2019/03/21/1846de9e-4a7b-11e9-8cfc-2c5d0999c21e\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/hiding-in-plain-sight-in-quiet-new-zealand-city-alleged-gunman-plotted-carnage/2019/03/21/1846de9e-4a7b-11e9-8cfc-2c5d0999c21e_story.html)

67 <https://www.smh.com.au/national/white-bred-terrorist-the-making-of-a-killer-20190806-p52ee7.html>

68 <https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-zealand-shooter-likely-acted-alone-police-say-11552780540>

69 <https://www.smh.com.au/national/white-bred-terrorist-the-making-of-a-killer-20190806-p52ee7.html>

70 <https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/world/2019/07/martin-sellner-a-history-of-non-violent-violence.html>



# EVIDENCE BASED SYNTHESIS

INTERNATIONAL MONEY TRANSFER APPLICATION

ANZ

Date payment to be made

Beneficiary full name

Beneficiary address (must be a physical address)

City Country

All banks require physical address, as part of anti-money laundering. Having a physical address gives certainty to a person's identity, since many others may have the same name.

5. The police have stated that the RRAT provided “two further referees, who met the requirements of the process”.<sup>71</sup> They obviously did not know the RRAT well, since they met only in an on-line chat room. It seems unusual that the police focused only on the process and ignored the validity of the two chatroom persons as referees. This is an obvious and stark case of ignoring the substance and purpose of the referees (that is, to determine if the applicant is a ‘fit and proper’ person) and simply following a colouring by numbers approach to permitting someone to use firearms.

6. When the mother of the RRAT visited him in December 2018, she was shown a ‘collection of guns’. She related, “he got the guns out of the car and showed them that he had guns”.<sup>72</sup> She also said that “He said he was in a rifle club or something..”.<sup>73</sup> This is most unusual in that, why was he carrying the guns in his car all the time, despite apparently having secure storage for his guns in his house which the Police claimed to have inspected.

7. It was reported that two IEDs were found “in a car”.<sup>74</sup> It is unusual that there was no follow-up information by the Police on how the IEDs were acquired and what their ultimate purpose was. The RRAT had no history of making IEDs and as such how and when were the IEDs assembled. It was subsequently learnt that on 30 April, “Police have located a package containing a suspected explosive device and ammunition at a vacant address... in Christchurch,” and that a man has been arrested.<sup>75</sup> The Police have not denied any links with the March 15 terror attack. This would have allayed the Muslim community.

71 <https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/christchurch-shooting/111480472/gun-licence-approval-for-man-charged-with-christchurch-shooting-followed-correct-process>

72 <https://www.smh.com.au/national/white-bred-terrorist-the-making-of-a-killer-20190806-p52ee7.html>

73 <https://www.smh.com.au/national/white-bred-terrorist-the-making-of-a-killer-20190806-p52ee7.html>

74 <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/03/15/new-zealand-police-respond-reports-mosque-shooting-christchurch/>



8. Everyone from the Prime Minister<sup>76</sup> to Police and gun experts<sup>77</sup>, have all mentioned that the gun used in the massacre was modified. In a later analysis a gun expert mentioned that the shotgun first used at the Deans Ave mosque appeared to be a Mossberg 930 semi-automatic. This gun has a magazine capacity of seven rounds, and once he ran out of ammunition in the shotgun, he appeared to dump it and switch to an AR15.<sup>78</sup> "The MSSA, the military-style semi auto ... used..., was not purchased from Gun City.

## WHO HELPED TO MODIFY THE GUN OR WAS ANOTHER GUN ILLEGALLY ACQUIRED?

Under the 1992 Arms Act, a semi-automatic AR15 sporting rifle can only have a magazine capacity of 7 rounds. One of the guns used in the massacre had magazines holding 30 rounds, 40 rounds, and 60 rounds.

Source: <https://www.newsroom.co.nz/2019/03/24/491934/panic-buying-of-guns-ahead-of-ban>

Gun City did not sell him a MSSA – only A-category firearms.<sup>79</sup> The New York Times mentioned that police officials still do not know the source of a semiautomatic rifle that can be seen in a video of the attack.<sup>80</sup> The issue of the guns needs to be clarified. Since the RRAT was not a gun expert, either someone helped him modify the gun or he had learned to do so from the internet. There is also the quandary as to whether the gun used was actually bought and modified, or one which was acquired from an unknown source. These issues and the possibility of others being involved have raised concerns for some in the community. The recent arrest of an NZDF soldier, who is a weapons specialist, in an investigation believed to be related to his suspected involvement in neo-nazi groups,<sup>81</sup> has also raised concerns.

75 <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/30/new-zealand-police-arrest-man-after-device-found-in-christchurch>  
76 <https://www.newsroom.co.nz/@news/2019/03/16/491470/ardern-our-gun-laws-will-change>  
77 <https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/111343558/panic-buying-of-guns-ahead-of-ban-sparked-by-christchurch-shooting>  
78 <https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/111370460/gun-city-owner-confirms-christchurch-shooting-accused-bought-guns-there>  
79 <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/20/world/asia/new-zealand-gun-ban.html>  
80 <https://unicornriot.ninja/2019/new-zealand-soldier-arrested-for-alleged-nazi-ties/>



## WHILST THE MEDIA PROMOTED ISLAMOPHOBIA... THIS NOT COVERED UNDER THE TERMS OF REFERENCE , THERE IS A SERIOUS CONCERN WITH RESPECT TO THE CHRISTCHURCH PRESS.

Whilst there is a plethora of information on the media’s role in promoting Islamophobia in New Zealand, the research by Rahman and Emadi ( 2018)<sup>82</sup> is the most thorough and provides a baseline of data based on empirical research. The research clearly demonstrates that both the NZ media and the international media accessed in NZ (newswires) were more prone to describe Islam in negative terms, such as “Islamic terrorism” and “ Islamic jihad”

**Table 1: Representations of Islam in NZ media, 2014-2017**


Topic	2014		2015		2016		2017	
	NZ	Int'l	NZ	Int'l	NZ	Int'l	NZ	Int'l
“Islam”	1,233	1,561	1,510	1,934	1,015	1,957	1,376	2,515
“Islamic terrorism”	7,178	8,258	10,301	11,683	8,024	10,745	7,774	11,472
“Islamic jihad”	5,630	6,364	8,407	9,291	6,148	7,780	5,199	6,997

Note: Results of searches using the terms “Islam”, “Islamic terrorism” and “Islamic jihad” on Newtext database on 17 July 2018

Within this pervading media-generated atmosphere of sustained Islamophobia, an article by the Christchurch Press on 4 June 2014 is particularly damaging. With no reference to any specific or tangible evidence, the article boldly proclaimed that terrorists were radicalised in Christchurch with the image of Masjid Al-Nur in the forefront .

What is even more disturbing was the label of “RADICAL BASE” with a question mark ( ?) . After much debate and Letters to the Editor some 3 days later there was an editorial which stated:

There is no real evidence that anyone in Christchurch is engaged in anything other than peaceful and religious activities at the mosque and the rest of the population should keep that firmly in mind. --- Editor <sup>83</sup>



82 <https://ojs.aut.ac.nz/pacific-journalism-review/article/view/419/622>

83 <http://www.stuff.co.nz/the-press/opinion/editorials/10129571/Editorial-Passing-connections-do-not-radicalise-a-mosqu>



# EVIDENCE BASED SYNTHESIS

Unfortunately the damage had already been done. As the Secretary of the Muslim Association at that time wrote to the editor in response to the article :

**“Headlines can be killers. The old truth endures – headlines do their work and few people will read a retraction or a correction days later.”<sup>84</sup>**

It is so sad to note the warning given by the Muslim Association Secretary some 5 years ago, was unfortunately proved to be a harrowing reality on 15 March.

The RRAT who committed the massacre at Masjid Al Nur had read the initial article and the eye-catching headline that the mosque was a radical base. As a justification for the massacre at this Masjid Al Nur, he wrote “it had a history of extremism”

The Christchurch Press and other NZ media outlets need to be reminded of their shameful role in engendering Islamophobia through baseless headlines . This is not a case of ‘freedom of expression’ but bordering on ‘calumny through hate mongering’. Such hate mongering has dire and tragic consequences.






### 4.3 Assertion 3

The NZSIS have the mandate to investigate and identify potential terrorists. This mandate has been focussed predominantly, if not exclusively, on Muslim individuals, organisations and entities. The consequences in our view have been to develop a frame of reference where Muslims have been perceived as the primary and potential perpetrators of terrorism. This myopic approach has been a consistent and deep cause of concern for some in the Muslim community. The inertia evident in focussing on the Right Wing Extremists, the lack of awareness of the NZ Police and the NZ border agencies (Customs and Immigration) of the threat posed by Racist Right Wing Extremists/Terrorists and the ease by which a terrorist has been able to carry out his massacre are unfortunate shadows of the framing approach.

### Context

Prior to outlining the information to substantiate our assertion, it is important to lay bare some of the contextual information. Firstly there are a plethora of committees, groups and entities under the umbrella of NZ Intelligence Community<sup>85</sup>





# EVIDENCE BASED SYNTHESIS

## SIS Considers Its Role To Be The National Security Organisation to Investigate and Identify Terrorists

The NZSIS considers its role as that of ensuring the security of all New Zealanders from threats such as terrorism. This key purpose has been explained in a number of ways by the SIS and all their explanations stress that they also have the mandate to covertly investigate any individual, group or entity who poses a threat.

### Evidence :

FROM 3 NZSIS SOURCES THAT THEY CONSIDER THEIR ROLE AS AVERTING THREATS TO NZ BY TERRORISTS AND TO INVESTIGATE AND IDENTIFY TERRORIST

BRIEFING TO INCOMING MINISTER

The first is keeping New Zealand and New Zealanders safe from significant national security threats. These threats include ... terrorism... Our functions allow us to covertly identify, investigate and report on these threats and risks.

[https://www.beehive.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2017-12/GCSB%20and%20NZSIS\\_0.PDF](https://www.beehive.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2017-12/GCSB%20and%20NZSIS_0.PDF)



PRESS BRIEFING

The purpose is security, the security of New Zealanders... And we have to do that by covert means because when people are planning to do ill to the country, they will try to keep that secret ..."

Rebecca Kitteridge, Director of the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service

[https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c\\_id=1&objectid=11351368](https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11351368)

### We're about security not spying: SIS chief

1 Nov, 2014 9:30am





# EVIDENCE BASED SYNTHESIS

NZSIS WEBSITE

Countering terrorism and violent extremism is an important part of the security intelligence work of the NZSIS. NZSIS may investigate any individual, group or entity that advocates violence in support of an ideology

<https://www.nzsis.govt.nz/our-work/counter-terrorism/>



New Zealand  
Security Intelligence  
Service  
Te Pā Whakamarumarū

Based on the above, it is quite self-evident that the NZSIS regards its role as the agency to keep “NZ and NZers safe from threats of terrorism.”<sup>86</sup> They are the human intelligence (people on the ground) to covertly investigate any individual, group or entity who pose a threat.



## Mission Creep and Budget Creep

Without a single Muslim being charged or convicted of terrorism in NZ , the Intelligence community have used the frame of reference of potential Muslim terrorists in NZ to increase their investigation and surveillance powers (mission creep) and also their budget.

### Evidence :

Year	Events	NZ SIS Budget Increase <sup>87</sup>
2001-2002	9/11 in New York	12.5% Increase for counter terrorism (\$13.5m)
2002-2003	12 Oct Bali Bombing	22% Increase for urgency of counter terrorism (\$16.5m)
2003-2007	Bombings in Jakarta, Istanbul and Madrid, ISIS, Syria,	By 2007 budget had increased to \$41.2m
2018	In NZ: Jihadi brides, returning ISIS, NZ Muslims under watch	By 2018 budget increased to \$82.843 million <sup>88</sup>
New Zealand	Intelligence community budget have increased from \$67 million (2013) to \$153million this year. <sup>89</sup>	
<b>Yet</b>		
Globally	The total number of global terrorist incidents have declined and deaths from terrorism are now 52 per cent lower than at their peak in 2014. <sup>90</sup>	

## 2002 to 2018 : Number of Muslims in NZ convicted on security related matters

- No Muslims charged or convicted on terrorism or related
- 2 Muslims were convicted of possessing objectionable material on ISIS and the Judges on both occasions stressed they were not prosecuted over terrorist acts.<sup>91</sup>
- A 15 year old was convicted but the Judge suppressed the youth's name and the details of the offending and he was released on intensive supervision with conditions<sup>92</sup>

### THE REALITY

Since 2001 to 2018 not one Muslim has been charged with any terrorism or related charges.

Yet the framing of NZ Muslims as potential perpetrators enabled both mission creep and budget increase.

87 [https://books.google.co.nz/books?id=TIGJr3Nqj1QC&pg=PA117&lpg=PA117&dq=NZSIS+budget+increases&source=bl&ots=ogR3VRuLkv&sig=ACfU3U0UUVcsK0QsC\\_ezNik9QE2UQRfrKIQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwibjM70t-fmAhVGeX0KHRq8BucQ6AEwC3oECAoQAQ#v=onepage&q=NZSIS%20budget%20increases&f=false](https://books.google.co.nz/books?id=TIGJr3Nqj1QC&pg=PA117&lpg=PA117&dq=NZSIS+budget+increases&source=bl&ots=ogR3VRuLkv&sig=ACfU3U0UUVcsK0QsC_ezNik9QE2UQRfrKIQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwibjM70t-fmAhVGeX0KHRq8BucQ6AEwC3oECAoQAQ#v=onepage&q=NZSIS%20budget%20increases&f=false)

88 <https://www.nzsis.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/2018-NZSIS-Annual-Report.pdf>

89 <https://www.nzsis.govt.nz/news/national/386111/new-zealand-enmeshed-in-web-of-security-agencies>

90 <http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2019/11/GTI-2019web.pdf>

91 <https://www.nzsis.govt.nz/news/national/307117/men-sentenced-for-islamic-state-material>


92 <https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/crime/101480988/kiwi-teenager-radicalised-online-planned-mass-killing-in-christchurch-for-allah>



## The Far Right Spectrum

Recent seminal research by Bjorgo and Ravndal (2019)<sup>93</sup> has provided a conceptualisation of the spectrum of the violent far right. The names of the organisations or movements may vary country to country however their ideological nuance is based on wreaking violence and terror. The categories are ideal type<sup>94</sup>

### CONCEPTUALISATION OF FAR RIGHT SPECTRUM<sup>95</sup>



93 <https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Extreme-Right-Violence-and-Terrorism-Concepts-Patterns-and-Responses.pdf>

94 <https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Extreme-Right-Violence-and-Terrorism-Concepts-Patterns-and-Responses.pdf>


95 <https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Extreme-Right-Violence-and-Terrorism-Concepts-Patterns-and-Responses.pdf>



## Violent Threatscape- A Reality Check


### Evidence:

It may be a surprise to note that globally the terror attacks have been dropping since 2014.<sup>96</sup> Globally terror attacks fell from about 17,000 in 2014 to about 11,000 in 2017.<sup>97</sup>



The Global Terrorism Index 2019 , published by the Institute for Economics & Peace , who receive their data from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) , which is a United States Department of Homeland Security Centre of Excellence led by the University of Maryland,<sup>98</sup> reported

- Total number of deaths from terrorism declined for the 4th consecutive year in 2018 . Falling by 15.2 % to 15,952 deaths



96 <https://qz.com/1435885/data-shows-more-us-terror-attacks-by-right-wing-and-religious-extremists/>


97 Ibid

98 <http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2019/11/GTI-2019web.pdf>



# EVIDENCE BASED SYNTHESIS

The economic impact of terrorism has also been declining , further validating the overall decline in global terrorism.<sup>99</sup>




## DECLINE OF ISIL TERRORISM

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is no longer the deadliest terrorist group in the world. In 2018, ISIL was responsible for 1,328 deaths — a 69 per cent drop from the previous year and an 85 per cent drop from its peak in 2016.<sup>100</sup>

## RAPID RISE OF RIGHT WING TERRORISM

Globally ,whilst there has been an overall decline in the number of terrorism incidents, there has however been a significant increase in far right terrorism in the past 5 years<sup>101</sup>



Whilst globally the right wing terrorism threat has been increasing rapidly ( 320% over 5 years) , however the NZIS asserts that “internationally the slow, but concerning rise of right wing extremism also continues.”. This ignores the empirical evidence.

99 <http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2019/11/GTI-2019web.pdf>

100 <http://visionofhumanity.org/global-terrorism-index/isil-is-no-longer-the-worlds-deadliest-terrorist-group/>

101 <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/12/death-killed-terrorism-isis-fallen-taliban-terrorist/>



## NZ FOCUS – REALITY CHECK OF ACCURACY

New Zealand	In December 2015, the Director General of Security( NZSIS) giving evidence to Parliament's powerful intelligence and security committee said, “..the past 12 months had seen a significant increase in the global terrorism threat..” <sup>102</sup>
	<b>Yet</b>
Globally	Deaths from terrorism decreased by ten per cent in 2015 to 29,376. This is the first decrease in number of deaths recorded since 2010. <sup>103</sup>  ( Source: US Dept of Homeland Security Centre of Excellence. )
New Zealand	<b>February 2019</b> Opening statement by the Director-General of Security, to the Intelligence and Security Committee <sup>104</sup> “Internationally the slow, but concerning rise of right wing extremism also continues.”
	<b>Yet</b>
Globally	<b>Global Terrorism Index 2019</b> <sup>105</sup> <b>Far-right Terrorism :</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Incidents of far-right terrorism have been increasing in the West, particularly in Western Europe, North America, and Oceania.</li> <li>• The total number of incidents have increased by 320 per cent over the past five years.</li> <li>• In 2018, total deaths attributed to far-right groups increased by 52 per cent.</li> <li>• Deaths have been increasing year on year for the past three years,</li> </ul> (Source: US Dept of Homeland Security Centre of Excellence.)
U.K.- Police	<b>Metropolitan Police, The Assistant Commissioner, Counterterrorism</b> Far-Right Terrorism Is the Fastest Growing Threat to the U.K.. He told journalists his unit had seen “significant increases” in far-right terrorism. “When nearly a third of the plots foiled by police and security services since 2017 relate to right-wing ideology, it lays bare why we are taking this threat so seriously,” he said.
USA- FBI	The FBI Director, Christopher Wray, recently told the US Congress that the Bureau had arrested about 100 domestic terror suspects in the past nine months and that “a majority of domestic terror cases we’ve investigated are motivated by some version of what you might call white supremacist violence”.
USA- ADL	<b>Anti-Defamation League,</b> Right-Wing Extremism Linked to Every 2018 Extremist Murder in the U.S. <sup>106</sup>
AUSTRALIA-ASIO	<b>Australian Security Intelligence Organisation , Annual Report 2019</b> <sup>107</sup> The threat from the extreme right wing in Australia has increased in recent years. Extreme right-wing groups in Australia are more cohesive and organised than they have been over previous years, and will remain an enduring threat.  This threat is not something new, but current extreme right-wing networks are better organised and more sophisticated than those of the past.

102 <https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/74881123/kiwi-jihadi-brides-on-the-rise>

103 <http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2016.2.pdf>

104 <https://www.nzsis.govt.nz/news/speech-opening-statement-to-the-intelligence-and-security-committee/>

105 <http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2019/11/GTI-2019web.pdf>

106 <https://www.adl.org/news/press-releases/right-wing-extremism-linked-to-every-2018-extremist-murder-in-the-us-adl-finds>

107 <https://www.asio.gov.au/sites/default/files/2018-19%20Annual%20Report%20WEB.pdf>





## THE FRAMING OF MUSLIMS AS POTENTIAL TERRORISTS ( ‘Securitising Islam and Muslims’)

The Director General of Security (NZSIS) has stated “Terrorism is not a ‘Muslim’ issue”. (2016).<sup>108</sup> This needs to be applauded. However, we have noted the reference to Muslims or Islam in almost every example<sup>109</sup> related to national security cited over the last 5 years in public speeches and official documents.

### Evidence :

Here are some examples of such references to Muslim and Islam in the context of NZ national security:

- Protecting New Zealand as a Free, Open and Democratic Society: The Role of the NZSIS, 3 June 2016
  - Jihadi brides = 2 times
  - Da’esh = 1
  - Radical Islam =1
  - ISIL = 2
- Opening statement to the Intelligence and Security Committee Posted February 20, 2019<sup>110</sup>
  - ISIL = 3 times
  - Da’esh/Al-Qaeda=1
- SiD Superstructure Group Intelligence Seminar May 2007
  - Islamic Extremist= 1
  - Radical Islamist terrorism = 1
  - Al-Qaeda = 1

Even after March 15, when the Muslim community was severely traumatised, the DG NZIS again raised the example of possible Muslim “revenge” terrorist attacks.

“Revenge attacks either in New Zealand or against New Zealand interests offshore – and you may recall that ISIS quickly called for such revenge attacks”.<sup>111</sup>

This continues the framing of Muslims as potential terrorists or the securitisation of Islam and Muslims.

108 <https://www.nzsis.govt.nz/assets/media/Speech-to-Victoria-University-3-June-2016-final-version.pdf>

109 Reference was made to Irish Terrorist in SiD Superstructure Group Intelligence Seminar May 2007

110 <https://www.nzsis.govt.nz/news/speech-opening-statement-to-the-intelligence-and-security-committee/>

111 <https://www.nzsis.govt.nz/news/speech-understanding-intelligence/>




# EVIDENCE BASED SYNTHESIS

This framing is also evident in almost all NZSIS Annual Reports- where ONLY examples of Islam and Muslims have been noted in the annual reports

- 2018 Annual Report
  - ISIL = 17 times
  - Islamist Extremist = 1
- 2017 Annual Report
  - ISIL = 17
  - Militant Jihad=1
- 2016 Annual Report
  - ISIL = 9
  - Jihadi fighters =1

## NZSIS – IGNORED REFERENCES TO RIGHT WING EXTREMISTS

The Washington Post report below shows the number of deadly attacks by those motivated by far-right ideology.<sup>112</sup>



In the above context, between 2009 to 2018 there was not one mention in any SIS or GCSB public documents or speeches about the terrorism and killing by far right extremists.

The right wing threat landscape did not exist for the NZSIS, despite overwhelming evidence.

Source: Radio NZ 2019 <https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/385173/no-mention-of-right-wing-extremist-threats-in-10-years-of-gcsb-and-sis-public-docs>

112 <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/04/02/is-right-wing-terrorism-violence-rise/>



# EVIDENCE BASED SYNTHESIS

## A MATTER OF ACCURACY: CONTINUING THE MISFRAMING OF NZ MUSLIMS AS POTENTIAL TERRORISTS

### Evidence:

#### Case : Jihadi Bride

The controversy arose when the DG of Security said during an Intelligence and Security Committee meeting in December 2015 that New Zealand was seeing an increase in the number of women travelling to Islamic State-controlled areas, possibly to become "jihadi brides". It then emerged in March, 2016 that the women, who had been discussed as a security risk to New Zealand, had not left from New Zealand, but were New Zealand citizens living in Australia and had left from there. <sup>113</sup>

**Kiwi Jihadi brides on the rise**

Tracy Watkins and Tommy Livingstone · 21:35, Dec 08 2015



ROBERT KITCHIN/FAIRFAX NZ

SIS director Rebecca Kitteridge talks about the increase in 'Jihadi Brides' on the NZ spy agency's watchlist.

The damage was done and there was a cloud of scaremongering that veil-clad Muslim women travelling overseas are potential jihadi brides.

Yet no apology from the SIS afterwards.

#### Case : 2018 Annual Report

The Threat Landscape

**Terrorism and Violent Extremism**

12 NZSIS ANNUAL REPORT 2018

Several individuals have been charged and convicted with offences relating to objectionable extremist material.

Only 2 Muslims in NZ have been convicted, not several as the NZSIS Annual report Claims.

It is also misleading to have this information under the heading 'Terrorism'. The judges in both the cases specifically mentioned that they had not been charged with terrorism-related activity.

<https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/307117/men-sentenced-for-islamic-state-material>

113 <https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/304217/sis-defends-nz-jihadi-brides-secretcy>



## CONSULTATION & COMMUNICATION

A key weakness evident in the context of the securitisation of Islam and Muslims has been insufficient genuine and meaningful consultation between the NZSIS and the Muslim community. Given the pivotal importance of the NZSIS and their extreme focus on the Muslim community in NZ, we would have expected more consultation and genuine discussion on issues. Since 2009, there have been 26 formal meetings, workshops, including presentation by the DG at the IWCNZ conferences.

The proactive and genuine consultation by the Maori, Pacific and Ethnic Services of the NZ Police have been the most exemplary. Over the last 10 years there have been no less than 128 formal meetings, consultations, workshops and seminars. The efficacy of the relationship of trust and cooperation was evident when the tragedy of 15 March happened. Within a few hours an entire team of

FIANZ officials was in place coordinating with the NZ Police MPES team on a hour-by-hour and day-by-day basis. Details of this have been documented.<sup>114</sup>

FIANZ also has regular consultation meetings with the Office of Ethnic Communities and DIA. There are State sector agencies that we liaise with on a need basis such as Immigration NZ, Justice, Attorney General Office, DPMC.

The Human Rights Commission Report<sup>115</sup> on state agencies communication with Muslims revealed that there was ample scope for improvement. With respect to the SIS, the manner in which Muslim youth and recent immigrants were approached and then suggested that they spy on their own community, does not benefit a transparent organisation.

However by far the greatest reputational damage to the Muslim community has been the unending reference by the SIS to 30 to 40 Muslims “under watch” for almost a decade. NZ Muslims like everyone else do not want extremism or terrorists in our midst. However, the constant reference to Muslims under watch not only aided generic Islamophobia but also aspersions on the wider NZ Muslim community. With only 2 convictions for ‘indecent publications’ as the tangible evidence<sup>116</sup> after almost a decade of “Muslims under watch” the performance scorecard of credibility and trust is being tested to its limit.

... by far the most reputational damage to the Muslim community has been the unending reference by the SIS to 30 to 40 Muslims “under watch”...

114 <https://fianz.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/ChCh-Report-FINAL.pdf>

115 <https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/385487/sis-accused-of-breaching-nz-muslims-rights-it-s-unethical-misleading-says-critic>

116 <https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/307117/men-sentenced-for-islamic-state-material>




## 4.4 Assertion 4:

It is our assertion that the threatscape should have included the Racists Right Wing Extremists/Terrorists from at least 2009/2010,<sup>117</sup> when there was ample global evidence of the significance of the terrorism threat posed by them. We further assert that by including the right wing extremists in the NIP at that time, there was ample evidence of the possibility of mitigating the terrorism threat, including the one which took place on 15 March.

New Zealand has one of the best national intelligence and security community in the world. The professionalism of the NZ Police, the NZSIS, the GCSB, the Customs and Immigration is beyond reproach. We are one of the safest and most transparent countries in the world due to their dedication and diligence.

However, it is unfortunate that NZIC did not focus on the growing emergence and threat of right wing extremists/terrorists from 2009/2010. In the following 5 years since then the number of right wing terrorist incidents had increased by 320% .<sup>118</sup>



## Evidence

Mitigating the threat of far right extremists, requires separate strategies than that used for the ISIL or Al-Qaeda inspired Islamist terrorist. The first step would have been to include Right Wing Extremism as part of the NIP. Having the far right in the security purview, like ISIL and Al-Qaeda, would immediately raise the threshold of investigation.

117 <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/12/death-killed-terrorism-isis-fallen-taliban-terrorist/>

118 ibid



## ‘Lone Wolves’ are Connecte

The lone wolf approach amongst right wing extremists has been a trend for a considerable time. 113 far-right attacks took place between 2013 and 2017 As Politico has noted , this rise in what appears to be so-called lone-wolf attacks is actually a sign that the far right is becoming steadily more well-organised and well-armed.<sup>119</sup>

Far-right extremists from different countries are increasingly well-connected. Anonymous messaging boards and extremist echo chambers like 8chan have allowed disparate groups and individuals to coalesce around similar grievances, enemies and strategic goals. Campaigns to disseminate propaganda materials, hateful messages and incitement to violence against Jews, Muslims, blacks, migrants and liberal politicians are often initiated and planned in these hidden yet global corners of the internet.<sup>120</sup>

On-Line Presence: The on-line presence of the Christchurch RRAT has been apparent for over 2 years. As the Sydney Morning Herald highlighted, “a handful of messages left on other social media sites gives clues about how his politics were developing, and how his online and real-life travels were converging. In 2016, he commented on Facebook with a post in support of Blair Cottrell, the Australian who led the anti-Islam white nationalist United Patriots Front (UPF).”<sup>121</sup> In May 2016, Tarrant’s language on Facebook turned violent. "Communists will get what communists get, I would love to be there holding one end of the rope when you get yours traitor," he wrote to Cottrell’s critics. Quite before the Christchurch attack, Tarrant changed his Facebook profile name to his real one and his profile picture to that of the "Aussie sh\*tposter" meme – a leering, dinky-di cartoon man wearing an Akubra hat. "Sh\*tposting" is an artefact of the chans. Originally, it referred to the practice of making chaotic and apparently meaningless posts designed to confuse, enrage or amuse. The language used in sh\*tposts on various boards can be so specific that it also serves to cement their communities and exclude outsiders. Sh\*tposts also serve as a filter for recruitment purposes. Those attracted to the memes can be invited to join darker and more explicit discussions. Sh\*tposting can morph into "effortposting" – posts designed to provoke specific behaviour – or "ops", real-world actions. Lads Society, an extreme far right on-line group, President Tom Sewell when contacted about the posts, preserved in screenshots by The White Rose Society, Sewell says people in his circle knew of Tarrant online going back about three years. In 2017, he even tried to recruit Tarrant over Facebook to his new Lads Society venture, to help create a white-only parallel society. Tarrant refused, Sewell says, as he was going to New Zealand. "If you read his manifesto it’s pretty clear that the guy felt there was no hope, that there was no solution other than war," Sewell says. The GCSB have extensive and proven experience in such trolling, as evidenced by Muslim on-line social media alerting SIS of possible radicalising<sup>122</sup>. If one Journalist can find such evidence online, the GCSB have far more resources and networks. However, this would only have been possible if the Right Wing extremists were in the NIP purview.

119 <https://www.politico.eu/article/far-right-terrorists-not-lone-wolves-white-supremacy-racism-crime/>

120 <https://www.politico.eu/article/far-right-terrorists-not-lone-wolves-white-supremacy-racism-crime/>

121 <https://www.smh.com.au/national/white-bred-terrorist-the-making-of-a-killer-20190806-p52ee7.html>

122 <https://www.mz.co.nz/news/national/385487/sis-accused-of-breaching-nz-muslims-rights-it-s-unethical-misleading-says-critic>



## Pattern of Travel

Just as NZ Muslims are regularly stopped and questioned as to their purpose of travel to certain destinations, the travel pattern of the Christchurch RRAT to right wing extremist preferred destinations would have necessarily alerted border security officials. According to Julia Ebner, an Austrian researcher into new waves of extremism with the London-based Institute for Strategic Dialogue, Europe's new far right is showing a keen interest in such destinations as the Balkans and certain European countries like Austria.<sup>123</sup> An unemployed young man, with radical right wing extremist views travelling to countries with extreme far right presence, would generate the same level of alert from border security (Customs and Immigration) as many Muslims face who currently travel to Arab countries.

## Firearms Licence

With Right Wing extremists as part of the focus group for the national intelligence community, any gun licence application would have at least have an on-line vetting before approval. This has now started with firearm licence applicants being checked for shaven heads, Nazi symbolism and camouflage clothes after the March 15 terror attack. Police issued a new directive informing vetting staff to be wary of the "extreme right", which includes white supremacy and far right ideology. Signifiers of the extreme right include tattoos, Celtic or Norse symbolism, books on the Third Reich, confederate flags, and reference to Norway mass-shooter Anders Breivik. White supremacist groups National Front and Right Wing Resistance were among those listed in the email sent to firearm vetters.<sup>124</sup>

## Approval for Bullets for AR-15

Another peg point for mitigating such attacks, if the far right had been under the NIP several years ago, would have the alert raised for bullets suitable for AR-15 machine guns.

123 <https://www.smh.com.au/national/white-bred-terrorist-the-making-of-a-killer-20190806-p52ee7.html>

124 <https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/christchurch-shooting/113666061/police-check-firearm-licence-applicants-for-signs-of-extreme-right-after-march-15-terror-attack>



## THE AR-15 IS THE WEAPON OF CHOICE FOR MASS SHOOTERS<sup>125</sup>

All have witnessed gun violence carried out by a killer brandishing an AR-15 or AR-15-style assault weapon, weapon of choice for mass shootings.

**Gun experts claim the reason mass shooters gravitate towards AR-15s is mainly due to a 'copycat' mentality as opposed to more precise gun knowledge.**

**June 20, 2012:**

James Holmes, 24, uses an AR-15-style .223-caliber Smith and Wesson rifle with 100-round magazine, among other firearms to kill 12 and injure 58 while dressed as The Joker from Batman at a movie theatre in Aurora, Colorado.

**December 14, 2012:**

Adam Lanza, 20, shoots dead 20 children between the age of six and seven, as well as six members of staff at Sandy Hook Elementary School. Amongst his arsenal was a Bushmaster AR-15, where he fired off more than 150 rounds in less than five minutes.

**December 2, 2015:**

Syed Rizwyan Farook, 28, and Tashfeen Malik, 27, use two AR-15-style .223-caliber Remington rifles and two 9mm handguns to kill 14 and injure 21 as his workplace in San Bernardino, California, before being killed by police.

**June 12, 2016:**

Omar Mateen, 29, bursts into the Orlando Pulse nightclub, using an AR-15-style rifle - a Sig Sauer MCX - as well as a 9mm Glock semi-automatic pistol to kill 49 and injure 50.

**October 1, 2017:**

Stephen Paddock, 64, uses a wide arsenal of guns, including an AR-15 to kill 58 and injure hundreds more at a music festival in Las Vegas. He doesn't even have to leave his hotel room at the Mandalay Bay hotel which overlooks the festival to carry out the worst mass shooting in US history. He commits suicide in the room.

**November 5, 2017:**

Devin Kelley, 26 uses an AR-15 style Ruger rifle to kill 26 people at a church in Sutherland Springs, Texas, before being killed.

**February 14, 2018:**

Nikolas Cruz, 19, uses an AR-15-style rifle to kill at least 17 students and teachers at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida. Cruz is captured and is currently awaiting trial.

**April 22, 2018:**

Travis Reinking, 29, armed with an AR-15-style rifle opens fire on a Waffle House in Tennessee, killing four people and injuring two more. He is prevented from killing more by James Shaw Jr, who hid near the restaurant's bathrooms and rushed the shooter, wrestling the rifle away. The gunman is captured 24 hours later.






# EVIDENCE BASED SYNTHESIS

## Financial Transaction

With some of the most sophisticated money transfer systems, the donation of €1500 to Sellner in 2018 and €2200 to the French far-right group Generation Identity (GI) between September 18 and 25, 2017<sup>126</sup> would have alerted the SIS, since both are known right wing extremists.

## Linkages to Known Terrorists:

The New York Times in a probing article noted the prior linkages between the various 'lone wolf' right wing extremists.<sup>127</sup>



This linkages may be 'on-line' support, facebook friends or those who are considered 'inspiration' or 'role models'. Such linkages provide a goldmine for intelligence community investigation .



## Peg-Points for Mitigation of Threat of RRAT

If the NZSIS had included the Right Wing Extremist/Terrorists as part of the threatscape much earlier, then there would have been ample mitigating opportunities to avoid the tragic events of 15 March. These peg points include:

- Lone Wolves Connection
- On-line Presence
- Pattern of Travel
- Firearms Licence
- Approval for bullets for AR-15
- Linkages to Other Terrorists

It is most heartening to see that the efficiencies of the NZ intelligence and security community have meant that within 6 months of the 15 March terrorist attack, another right wing extremist, who had served as an arms specialist in the NZDF, has been arrested.<sup>128</sup>



## 5.00 TERMS OF REFERENCE : RECOMMENDATIONS

The issues we have sought to address in this section are related to 'Findings' and are based on the Terms of Reference

### **5 Matters upon which recommendations are sought**

- (1) The inquiry must make any recommendations it considers appropriate on the following:
  - (a) whether there is any improvement to information gathering, sharing, and analysis practices by relevant State sector agencies that could have prevented the attack, or could prevent such attacks in the future, including, but not limited to, the timeliness, adequacy, effectiveness, and co-ordination of information disclosure, sharing, or matching between relevant State sector agencies; and
  - (b) what changes, if any, should be implemented to improve relevant State sector agency systems, or operational practices, to ensure the prevention of such attacks in the future; and
  - (c) any other matters relevant to the above, to the extent necessary to provide a complete report.
- (2) To avoid doubt, recommendations may concern legislation (but not firearms legislation), policy, rules, standards, or practices relevant to the terms of reference, maintaining consistency with the widely accepted values of a democratic society.

In the previous Section we aimed at establishing a nexus between our considered viewpoints on the tragedy of March 15 and the evidence we have been able to glean from primary and secondary sources .

This section on Recommendations addresses the lessons learned from the impact of 15 March and the changes we believe are necessary for future generations of New Zealanders, regardless of their ideologies, inclinations and identities. We do not consider this a wish list nor do we consider it an approach to just make amends or fix the problems which led to the massacre of 51 persons and injured 49 others. We consider 'Recommendations' a strategic opportunity to provide a vision for the future where the 'You Are Us' paradigm of hope becomes a pathway and programme for future generations.

In arriving at our recommendations , we have considered 3 main perspective baselines:

- 1 The vision of change will need to be inclusive of all people regardless of their ideologies, inclinations and identities. We have not made any recommendation which would only benefit Muslims. That would counter the 'you are us ' view . We have tried to be all-inclusive from the tangata whenua to the most recent migrants. For us this bringing together is mandated
- 2 The recommendations have to be consensus orientated, rather than creating segments within society who agree or disagree with the recommendations. For us this means to develop, discuss & debate and then adopt. As such, the process may take time and a lot of patience.
- 3 We have to make our recommendations future proofed but soundly based on the history of lessons learned. For such an approach we need to have a strategic mindset which is firmly rooted in sensible thinking. Pragmatism is the key parameter guiding our recommendations.



# EVIDENCE BASED SYNTHESIS

## Focus on Categories

An analysis of the TOR and the tragedy which is our focus, raises many issues and considerations which need to be addressed. We have categorised the ones we consider the most important with the following rationale

Category	Rationale	Focus	Implementation Time Frame
<b>Issues of Significance</b>			
Security	The peaceful way of life in NZ which we have known for generations was violated leaving deep scars of trauma and fear for the future. We have to restore our previous mindset of a clean, green and safe home, which is Aotearoa.	State Agencies, Parliament	Short to Medium Term
Hatred and Racism	These are age-old ailments which requires an 'all of society' treatment. We need to have mechanisms and apparatus to detect, diagnose and treat the disease. We also need societal vigilance to prevent any outbreak.	Society, State Agencies and Parliament	Medium to Long Term
Terrorism	Ideologies which prescribe violence have no place in 'Our Aotearoa'. We have to deny them any harbour in our shores.	Society, State Agencies and Parliament	Short Term
Nationhood and Superdiversity	Defining the paradigm "You are Us" means having a shared and agreed path for our multiculturally diverse nation.	Society and Education Sector	Medium to Long Term
<b>Technical Consideration</b>			
Weapons	Technical and regulative considerations which aim at 'best practice'.	Parliament and State Sector Agencies	Short Term
Information			



## Recommendation Focus

The focus of our recommendation is at multi levels. The societal focus, is an all-inclusive focus on all those who call Aotearoa their homeland. The 'All of Government' applies to all state sector Ministries and agencies. The other focus are all self-explanatory.

### ALL OF SOCIETY

#### Criminalise Hate Speech

- FIANZ believes that it is critical for the wellbeing of society for different religious teachings to be discussed openly and publicly and for dialogue between different religious, ethnic, and cultural communities to be open and inclusive, rational and civilised.
- FIANZ believes that positions on moral and social issues and theological matters that are unpopular or contradict majority public opinion or positive law should be protected by freedom of speech and religion.
- However, there is a clear line between the freedom to openly and publicly discuss, defend, and teach different positions on moral and social issues and theological matters, and professing hatred and inciting violence. While the former are necessary for the maintenance and progress of a free and democratic society, the latter are destructive for a free and democratic society.
- FIANZ welcomes the governments review into updating the Human Rights Act to provide protections for religion and other diverse groups. FIANZ believes that the Harmful Digital Communications Act also needs to be reviewed to tackle online hate and bullying effectively.
- There should be a coordinated process established across agencies and crown entities dealing with hate speech so that communities have a singular reporting and complaints process. Currently hate speech is dealt with by various government entities including DIA, Police, Human Rights Commission and Netsafe. There is no coordination of response or a singular triaging process to deal with complaints or getting content removed off online platforms.
- There is currently no designated support services for people affected by Hate Speech and Hate Crime. This is left largely to communities themselves to support one another. Victim support is provided as a general reference during court cases but what is required is additional services for persons affected on a regular basis. This will require specialists who understand the various forms of HATE and who have the cultural, religious, linguistic, knowledge and specific skills to address the harm caused to victims. It will also require a telephone service for persons to contact and linkages to any online reporting process so that persons can be adequately supported.

#### Racism

- Commit government and society to eliminating personal, cultural, institutional, and structural racism and advancing racial equality in Aotearoa New Zealand in line with Te Tiriti o Waitangi, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. ( Context Racism)



## ALL OF SOCIETY

### Information

- Leverage our dynamic comparative advantage in indigenous and Pacific newsgathering, storytelling, and reporting, and our nation's credibility, to build the organisation into the Aljazeera, CNN, or BBC of the Asia-Pacific.( Context Information)
- This capability will broaden and deepen our soft power in the region and globally as the centre of geopolitical gravity pivots to the Indo/Asia-Pacific, and will enable Aotearoa to project our national identity and values.
- This investment in our soft power capabilities would balance our multibillion dollar defence investments in hard power upgrades.
- Producing high quantities of high quality information is necessary to help populations, business leaders, and political leaders understand, prepare for, and take advantage of the complex regional and global transformations that are causing disorientation, destabilisation, alienation, and polarisation.
- Mobilise civil society, the media, government, and academia to inform public debate and opinion. The careful deliberation of an informed public on the future of our country can preserve the political centre, consensus-based politics, the rule of law, social cohesion, and support for rules-based international order, multilateralism, and open market economics, and prevent the rise of populism, polarisation, authoritarianism, and violent extremism.

### Terrorism

- This resecuritisation of terrorism involves the collective effort of politicians, officials, media, and academics.



## ALL OF GOVERNMENT

### Security

- The annually refreshed NIP should be subject to general debate and voted on by Parliament after approval by the Cabinet National Security Committee. ( Context; Security)
- Desecuritize migration in official and political discourse.
- Tendencies toward the securitisation of migration, regular and irregular, and the militarisation of borders in Europe, North America, and Australia, are more deadly on a global scale than RWE terrorism.
- Securitising rhetoric around border security and migration provides support to RWE narratives that frame Muslim and non-white migration as demographic, normative, and ontological threats to Western identity and values, and creates an enabling environment for audiences to be receptive to RWE narratives.
- Official and political security discourse in New Zealand has contributed to the securitisation of migration. The extent to which migration has been securitised is not yet as extreme as other Western countries. The NZIC's threat assessment of migration as the number one security threat to New Zealand in the 2015 briefing to the incoming Minister is a prime example of the danger that the securitisation of migration can support and legitimate notions of the "great replacement" and of non-white "invasion".
- Politicians promoting conspiratorial RWE talking points on migrants and refugees, and spreading misinformation and disinformation about migrants and refugees for political marketing purposes, is extremely dangerous to Aotearoa New Zealand's national security.
- There is a need for officials and politicians to normalise the politics of migration by focusing on the costs and benefits of economic openness, and pragmatic solutions to the dynamic disequilibria within societies created by openness to global markets for labour, capital, goods, services, and ideas.

### Hate

- Statistics should be collected on complaints, prosecutions, convictions, and sentences to provide an accurate picture of the state of hate in New Zealand. ( Context : 12 Hate Crime)
- Formulate and implement a National Hate Crime Action Plan.
- Establish a specific Offence of Hate Crime under the Crimes Act. Currently there is no specific Hate Crime offence and this makes it challenging to collate the exact number of offences that are reported, investigated and convicted.
- Establish a dedicated Hate Crime unit within Police to monitor, analyse, work with other agencies and communities, train police staff and advise on investigations and prosecutions of Hate Crime. This is in line with other best practice models for police groups internationally.



## ALL OF GOVERNMENT

- There is currently no designated support services for people affected by Hate Speech and Hate Crime. This is left largely to communities themselves to support one another. Victim support is provided as a general reference during court cases but what is required is additional services for persons affected on a regular basis. This will require specialists who understand the various forms of HATE and who have the cultural, religious, linguistic, knowledge and specific skills to address the harm caused to victims. It will also require a telephone service for persons to contact and linkages to any online reporting process so that persons can be adequately supported.
- Engage with New Zealand minority communities and look to countries such as the United Kingdom for models and best practices. ( Context: 13 – Hare Crime Action Plan)
- Include in this support for the Human Rights Commission, Police, universities, and civil society organisations such as FIANZ and the national bodies of other ethnic and religious minorities, particularly the New Zealand Jewish Council, to build a national project on the model of Tell MAMA and the Community Security Trust. ( Context : 13- Hate Crime Action Plan)
- This project would ensure that racial and religious hate incidents and attacks in Aotearoa are monitored, mapped, measured, recorded, and reported to police when requested, victims are adequately supported, and statistics and analysis are regularly provided to Government, academia, and media. ( Context : 13- Hate Crime Action Plan)

### Terrorism

- Fund increased security for mosques, Islamic centres, and other places of worship vulnerable to RWE, particularly synagogues. This work programme should be coordinated with the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations action plan to safeguard the sanctity of religious sites.
- Launch a comprehensive national “exit programme” for members of terrorist groups, extremist movements, and gangs.
- Establish a multidisciplinary and multiagency taskforce capable of assessing and meeting the individual psychological, social, health, security, economic, financial, and legal needs of people wanting to transform their lives.
- Develop a Countering Violent Extremism Strategy for New Zealand. There is currently no CVE strategy for New Zealand. A CVE strategy has been advocated for repeatedly most recently by the Human Rights Commission in 2017. New Zealanders deserve to know how the priority of violent extremism will be prevented and addressed. They also deserve to see a transparent strategy that is developed in partnership with them and implemented.





## ALL OF GOVERNMENT

### Racism

- Recognise the different experiences of racism by differently racialised groups by explaining and defining anti-Māori, anti-Pasifika, anti-Black, anti-Chinese, anti-Indian, and anti-Arab racism; gendered racism; colourism; Islamophobia; anti-Semitism; and xenophobia.
- Consult with iwi and community leaders and stakeholders.
- Consult with legal and academic experts and civil society.
- Learn from international experience in countries such as South Africa.
- Draw on United Nations human rights instruments and declarations.
- Specify obligations on classes of public and private sector organisations in relation to eliminating personal, cultural, institutional, and structural racism and advancing racial equality.
- Include the obligation to develop a multicultural and multifaith strategy focused on eliminating all forms of racism, Islamophobia, anti-Semitism, and related discrimination, building on the work of the HRC's Diversity Action Programme, Te Ngira.
- Include "racial equality implications" and "superdiversity perspective" in the key requirements of a general Cabinet paper under other implications sections in addition to existing human rights implications, gender implications, and disability perspective. Create a tool to assist Cabinet decision-making to examine how superdiversity and racial equality are affected by Government action modelled on Bringing Gender In.
- Declare the United Nations Committee on Racial Discrimination competent to receive and consider individual communications under Article 14 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.
- Accelerate the Alliance of Civilizations New Zealand Implementation Plan at the local, national, regional, and global levels.
- Commit resources to funding measures towards our stated objectives in the areas of education, youth, media, and migration.



## ALL OF GOVERNMENT

### Nationhood

- Analyse and develop capacity programmes to eliminate root structural causes of alienation and polarisation. These could include anomie, alienation, un(der)employment, inequality, poverty, isolation, anxiety, depression, drug and alcohol addiction, violence, the disintegration of communities and families, and the devaluation of cultural and faith traditions. These are the main drivers of polarisation and radicalisation in the hypermodern world.
- Engage in a national programme to enhance the inclusive, global, postcolonial, multicultural, multifaith national identity for Aotearoa New Zealand – a common sense of “who we are” as a nation that makes true the Prime Minister’s powerful statement that “this is not us”. This national programme of Social Inclusion should be prioritised as a national strategy and have a dedicated work programme. We are currently one of the most diverse countries in the world and it is deeply concerning that we do not have a holistic programme to assist with social inclusion and the rise of hate and discrimination in New Zealand.
- Funding to the Ministry for Culture and Heritage (including sport and recreation) for nation-building should increase. We need to tell our stories and share our unique perspectives on events. Our creative people from our diverse artistic and cultural traditions, and our ethnically and religiously diverse sportspeople, will define our nation in the twenty-first century.
- Post-Christchurch and in the wider social, historical, and geographical context of the post-settlement period of Crown-Māori relations, the Pacific reset, and the Asian century, nation-building should be the top priority for the Minister of Arts and Culture and Ministers holding other relevant portfolios such as Trade, Foreign Affairs, Sport and Recreation, Ethnic Communities, and Te Arawhiti.
- Government should work with iwi leaders, business leaders, and civil society to reconstruct our national identity and reject societal and economic closure, xenophobia, racism, anti-Semitism, and Islamophobia.
- Memorialise 15 March.
- Officially commemorate 15 March as a National Day of Prayer and Reflection.
- Allocate funding to the Ministry for Culture and Heritage to finance the production of public art and cultural events to commemorate the martyrs and learn from the attack.
- Turn Aotearoa New Zealand into a regional and global information hub for the Asian century by establishing a global non-commercial news and current affairs channel as part of the proposed RNZ-TVNZ merger.
- Review Islamophobia, anti-Semitism, xenophobia, and other forms of racial and religious discrimination, intolerance, and hatred in all New Zealand’s political movements and parties.



## ALL OF GOVERNMENT

### Information

- Increase public funding for the production of content for television, radio, print, and social media that challenges common stereotypes and exposes audiences to more balanced, positive representations of minority cultures. This includes minority cultures within Aotearoa New Zealand and of the diversity of cultures and religions in the Indo/Asia-Pacific region to which our security and wellbeing are inextricably linked.

### Superdiversity

- Diversify the public service. Establish set goals and realistic targets to have diversity at all levels of the public service, including senior leadership.
- Establish designated independent Commissioners within the State Services Commission for Maori Pacific and Ethnic communities in order to oversee the recruitment, retention and leadership development of MPE personnel within the public sector.
- Conduct a review into the appointments process of Chief Executives and senior leadership teams in the public sector. It is a serious concern that while the State Services Commissioner openly talks about diversity and inclusion and has a diversity and inclusion strategies, that the senior leadership of the public sector is so overwhelmingly mono cultural including gender. There is no intersectionality of representation. Hold the State Services Commissioner accountable for the failure to reach targets for diversity.
- Conduct a Royal Commission of Inquiry into institutional racism and structural discrimination within the public sector. It is damning that after decades of highlighting concerns of representation and reflecting the society of New Zealand that our public service is still mono cultural. In 2018 and 2019 during the last round of senior appointments, we witnessed a moving of chairs and roles with Chief Executives being swapped from one government agency to another and all new appointments being largely pakeha for both men and women.
- Conduct a review into the Career Boards and the Talent Exchange programme managed by the State Services Commission. There is no transparency of process and functionality of the Career Boards and Talent Exchange. Its boards are predominantly pakeha and career development and progression of minority communities are not keeping pace with the experience and expertise required for working with New Zealand's changing demographics. Across the entire public sector the key roles of Chief Executives and senior leaders as well as independent Commissioners are largely pakeha men and women. It is an indictment on the failure of the SSC Career Boards and Talent Exchange programmes.
- Despite progress toward diversity and inclusion in the public sector, Pākehā are still over-represented as Managers and Policy Analysts.
- Agencies must recruit, develop, and promote ethnically and religiously diverse staff to senior management and policy positions.



## ALL OF GOVERNMENT

- Monitoring and reporting on progress toward diversity and inclusion objectives must identify actions taken to recruit, develop, and promote diverse staff, and disaggregate statistics to show changes over time in the demographics of senior management and policy positions.
- Establish Maori, Pacific and Ethnic Liaison officers (similar to the Police) in all Government agencies.
- Establish benchmarks and targets for building diversity in the Public Service at all levels including senior leadership.
- FIANZ commends the Government's commitment to additional funding for Canterbury mental health services to help respond to the ongoing impacts of the 15 March terrorist attack. This was an attack on New Zealand. It is critical that the mental health and wellbeing needs of not only survivors, the Muslim community in Christchurch, and Cantabrians (including first responders), but all New Zealanders are met. This includes particularly New Zealand Muslims in other regions that are experiencing trauma, depression, and anxiety ranging in levels of severity. It is also vital that appropriate and accessible mental health and wellbeing services are specifically funded for survivors.
- The experience of Muslim mental health experts with our community has shown that, due to social stigmas around mental health, Muslims often refuse to engage in psychotherapeutic interventions. There is a need to investigate culturally and religiously appropriate approaches to mainstream interventions, and effective alternative clinical interventions, such as micronutrients.
- Provide far more comprehensive services to superdiverse communities to inform individuals (in their language, if required) about Aotearoa's legal, political, and economic system, and socialise individuals into our legal, political, and economic culture and institutions.
- Advocate across Government agencies for the collective rights and interests of superdiverse communities.
- Be transparent and accountable to superdiverse communities, provide accurate notes of meetings, commit to taking specified actions on issues raised by community leaders and stakeholders, manage expectations, and report progress on issues.
- Provide thought leadership and set the standard of best practice on multicultural and multi-faith equity and inclusion in the public sector.
- Deliver effective initial and regular ongoing training to frontline Government staff across sectors to uphold the highest standards of ethical integrity and professional conduct, and to unlearn implicit and explicit biases. Experiences of discrimination are detrimental to the mental health and wellbeing of clients.
- Establish Maori, Pacific and Ethnic Liaison officers (similar to the Police) in all Government agencies.



## NZ POLICE

### Hate

- Police must be trained in accurately and sensitively identifying and reporting crimes which are perceived by the victim, the officer, or any other person to be motivated by a hostility based on a personal characteristic. This must involve human rights, cultural competency, and unconscious bias training. ( Context : 12 Hate Crime)
- Establish Police Ethnic Liaison officers in every police District in New Zealand with a consistency in rank. Larger cities and regions with large former refugee and migrant populations should have additional ethnic liaison roles.
- Establish Police Ethnic Advisory boards in every police district with representatives from the community.
- Conduct an Inquiry as to why the 20 Ethnic liaison officers that was provided to the New Zealand Police by the last government did not have the positions filled. Where did these roles go and why were they changed to fill other liaison and police roles?
- Conduct an Inquiry as to why the Christchurch Police specifically did not have their two ethnic liaison roles filled for a considerable period of time in the lead up to and post 15 March and why their Ethnic advisory board had not met during the lead up to and post 15 March 2019.
- Provide additional personnel resources and a larger budget for Maori Pacific and Ethnic Services at Police National Headquarters to oversee ethnic communities nationally. The ethnic area of policing must keep pace with the changing demographics and so must leadership, resourcing and budget for this area
- Establish dedicated trainers for Ethnic communities at the Police College at a senior manager level. Review why the Police College did not have dedicated trainers for Ethnic communities in the lead up to and post 15 March 2019.
- Ensure the Police National Security and Counter Terrorism Group and National Security and Intelligence Threats group has sufficient independent oversight and not overstep its mandate in targeting minority communities unfairly. Ensure it sticks to its role of national security and not blur and overstep its role by conducting community engagement and securitising engagement to gather intelligence and target minority communities. Engagement and partnerships should be left to other specialised police groups not NSCTG and NSIT.
- Direct the police to develop all training regarding Muslim and other minority communities in partnership with those communities and not by Intelligence analysts who have no relationship with those communities.
- Establish a leadership development programme for Maori Pacific and Ethnic leaders within Police. Currently senior leaders are appointed in an ad hoc with no visible support and mentoring in a dedicated and transparent manner.
- Compel police to publish annual statistics of the leadership development and appointment of Maori Pacific and Ethnic persons in Police.



## NZ POLICE

- Conduct an independent review into institutional racism in the New Zealand Police.
- Develop capacity of visible and vulnerable minorities to provide for their own basic security.
- The UK government committed £5m over 3 years to put in place a new security training fund for places of worship of all faiths. During Ramadan, the Home Office supported Faith Associates to provide security training and advice to mosques, community centres and madrassahs. This should be replicated.
- Waikato Police have been working with male youth from Waikato Akhi Initiative, who voluntarily provided basic security during Ramadan. So far, there have been two basic training sessions. FIANZ calls for this model to be developed and expanded nationally to places of worship of all faiths who express an interest, with a formal certified training programme, uniforms, and equipment provided by Police. Volunteers must be adequately trained and equipped to deter or manage a serious threat, including training with emergency services to ensure effective communication and rapid response times.
- Set a higher threshold for assessing whether an applicant is a “fit and proper” person in operational policy.
- Formally include psychometric assessment of extremist and racist beliefs and signs of RWE (tattoos etc.), and social media, forums, and message boards, in assessing whether an applicant is a “fit and proper” person.
- Replace the 280 casual vetting staff with sworn Police officers with specialist training in psychological assessments of applicants as “fit and proper”.
- Centralise and standardise processes across districts.
- Subject districts to periodic review and practice assessment.
- Ensure that the logic of restructuring is improved safety, not efficiency.
- Review current licenses issued in last 5 years to ensure that correct process has been followed. Reassess the applications of licensees who were approved without following the correct process, and revoke if necessary the licenses of individuals who are not “fit and proper” persons.
- Revoke the licenses of individuals who have come to the attention of Police for extremist and racist beliefs and signs of RWE, including on social media& forums.
- Automatically investigate large, unusual, or frequent purchase orders, and the scrutinise with extreme caution any large, unusual, or frequent purchase orders of a licensee who has held their firearms licence for less than one year.
- Review previous large, unusual, or frequent purchase orders in of last 5 years.



## NZ POLICE

### Terrorism

- Fund increased security for religious places such as Mosques / Islamic Centres, Synagogues, Temples, Gurdwaras, Churches and other places of worship vulnerable to RWE.
- Provide visible deterrence security of major events of various faiths, for instance for Muslims during Eid ul Fitr and Eid ul Adha, for Jews during Hanukkah, etc.
- FIANZ requests that the Police presence be as peaceful and demilitarised as possible (consistent with threat assessments) to ensure that participants feel safe.

## NZIC

### Security

- Open and democratise the process of setting and reviewing New Zealand's National Intelligence Priorities to the greatest possible extent to ensure that these deliver value to Aotearoa New Zealand's security and wellbeing and reflect our core values, identity, and strategic interests.
- The detailed NIP intelligence requirements should be subject to scrutiny by the Intelligence and Security select committee.
- Produce a declassified version of the NIP for proactive release to the public. This began in 2019/2020 after the Christchurch terrorist attack with the inclusion of the NIP in the DPMC annual report as an appendix. ( Context: Security)
- The declassified NIP should include an explanation, in plain language, of what they mean for the security and wellbeing of Aotearoa New Zealand. ( Context: Security)
- The declassified NIP should be on the DPMC, NZSIS, and GCSB websites.
- The annual reports for the DPMC, NZSIS, and GCSB should include details regarding the actions taken to promote each of the NIP. To the greatest extent possible consistent with national security, these should be declassified in the interests of transparency and accountability. ( Context: Security)
- When state agencies have pivotal defined roles , there needs to be periodic stocktake of the definition and direction so as to increase the value proposition of the agency.
- Consider a full inquiry on the structure and role of the NZSIS and GCSB.
- Coordinate with our Australian partner agencies through the Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee (ANZCTC) on counter-terrorism policy, capabilities (improvements to information gathering, sharing, and analysis practices), legislation, and the enabling environments of all forms of extremism. This includes populist and nationalist rhetoric and the political mobilisation of the population through the securitisation of Islam and migration.



## NZIC

- Review training providers, and retrain existing staff on the various faiths in New Zealand. This extends to the NZIC, Police, NZDF, MFAT, Corrections, and Customs. In the case of Islam FIANZ strongly believes that locally contextualised knowledge of Islam and Muslims in New Zealand is more valid than international experience for assessing the threat of Islamist extremism.
- Hire analytical staff with expertise in RWE to DPMC, NZSIS (particularly CTAG), GCSB, MFAT, NZDF, Police, Corrections, and Customs as part of the SIB's programme to build a high performing, cohesive and effective security and intelligence sector workforce.
- Establish protocols to prevent the infiltration of strategic Government positions, particularly NZDF and Police, by right wing extremists – what the Christchurch terrorist refers to as the “Lightening March through the institutions” – and the accidental radicalisation of NZIC, NZDF, Police staff at work. This may occur through training, exposure, influence, or socialisation. A special counterintelligence unit must be established.
- This work of developing our local knowledge base and creating a more diverse and inclusive research environment will feed back into the NZIC, NZDF, and MFAT, and help to prevent future attacks by educating and diversifying the security and intelligence, defence, and foreign policy workforces, and producing the knowledge and theory to inform the practice of the NZIC, NZDF, and MFAT.
- Desecuritize Islam and Muslims, and resecuritize terrorism rationally.
- Shift from an identity-based to a behaviour-based paradigm. The NZIC has already made moves in this direction, but this needs to be more thorough.

## Terrorism

- Avoid framing of Muslims as a “suspect community” and our youth as “at risk”, or exclusively framing Muslims as the likely perpetrators and not the possible victims of terrorism, which directly and indirectly securitize Muslims and Islam.
- Deny extremists the freedom to travel, network, communicate, mobilise, and finance terrorism, and limit their ability to create, distribute, and consume extremist content and radicalise, motivate, inspire, and recruit online.
- Allocate counter-terrorism resources rationally based on empirical evidence. This will involve thoroughly reviewing the NIP cycle.
- Restructure the SRRP to ensure that it is representative of the superdiversity of Aotearoa New Zealand and our values and identity, and increase its powers. Bringing together different perspectives to act as a “critical friend” to the NZIC is a safeguard against business-as-usual and the reproduction of institutional racism and Islamophobia.
- Produce an annual terrorism situation and trend report for the New Zealand public modelled on EUROPOL TE-STAT.





## NZIC

- The basic structure of the TE-STAT report includes trends, general overview, and sections on the terrorism threat of Islamist extremists, ethno-nationalists and separatists, left wing extremists, right wing extremists, anarchists, and single-issues, and seven annexes for transparency and accountability.
- This basic structure lends itself to the rational securitisation of terrorism and away from the securitisation of Islam or the politicisation of security.
- Run effective programmes to eliminate institutionalised discrimination and ethno-centric bias in the NZIC and the Police.
- The Royal Commission must inquire into patterns and practices of racism and anti-Muslim bias to determine their findings and recommendations.
- The Royal Commission may recommend that separate inquiries be launched into the matter of institutional racism and anti-Muslim bias by the Independent Police Conduct Authority and Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security. Indigenous and racialised minority communities should be given legal and financial assistance to submit evidence to these inquiries. The scope of these inquiries should include the period after the Christchurch terrorist attack, including the Armed Response Team trial.
- Specific policies to hire, develop, and promote diverse staff to positions of senior leadership and policy analysis must be set, enacted, and reported on.
- Remove the Police Distance Learning Course cost (\$715) and include a pro rata bursary for students from migrant and refugee backgrounds or with financial hardship during the 12-week course to achieve existing recruitment diversity goals. A barrier to entry for potential recruits from migrant and refugee backgrounds is that it may be significantly more difficult to work full time and study part time, and that these potential recruits may take longer than the estimated 12-15 hours per week to complete the coursework.
- Empower staff with resources, and capacitate the NZIC and Police to deliver effective initial and regular ongoing training to uphold the highest standards of ethical integrity and professional conduct, and to unlearn implicit and explicit biases.

## SPECIFIC STATE SECTOR AGENCIES

### Racism

- Direct MFAT to elevate the UNAOC and interfaith and intercultural dialogue at the regional and global levels as a priority area for Peace, Rights, and Security.
- Direct Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet to appoint an expert advisor on Ethnic communities.
- Direct national security agencies to develop and
- Strengthen and increase funding and resourcing for the Inspector General of Intelligence and Security. There must be increased oversight and greater community connection by this important office. Ensure that this office has an advisor on Ethnic communities and an advisory board consisting of diverse communities. Ensure that there is a transparent complaint process into this agency by communities.
- Direct Security and Intelligence Services to develop relationships with independent Think Tanks and academia outside the Five Eyes countries in order to broaden their expertise.



## SPECIFIC STATE SECTOR AGENCIES

- Develop home grown expertise into our Security and Intelligence organisations than making appointments largely from other Five Eye Countries and largely pakeha.

### Superdiversity

- Actively recruit superdiverse families as foster caregivers for Oranga Tamariki – Ministry of Children to ensure that religious, linguistic, and ethnic minority children in State care are placed with families that can support their mental health and wellbeing.
- Develop mental health and wellbeing capabilities adapted to the changing needs of our superdiverse society.
- Design and implement initiatives through the Ministry of Health to train mental and allied health professionals to become more culturally competent and sensitive to cultural, ethnic, linguistic, and religious differences. It is important to understand that one solution that might help one minority group might not be appropriate to another minority group. Mental and allied health practitioners and policy makers must adopt a superdiversity perspective.
- Elevate the Office of Ethnic Communities to the Ministry level. :New Zealand’s demographic transition is one of the most significant and visible social transformations to result from the 1980s neoliberal restructuring. Yet, we do not have the governance capabilities to manage the process and ensure social cohesion, justice, and development. It was not until 2000 that the Office of Ethnic Affairs was established, which in 2015 became The Office of Ethnic Communities. The Office is constituted as a third tier business unit within the Department of Internal Affairs, and does not report directly to the Minister for Ethnic Communities. It lacks human and financial resources and credibility with Aotearoa’s superdiverse communities. The situation is an omnishambles.
- FIANZ recommends that we disestablish the OEC and establish a Ministry for Superdiversity that recognises the intersecting ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious identities of people living in Aotearoa New Zealand, including their visa type, refugee status, residency, or citizenship.
- With immediate effect, elevate the OEC within the DIA from the Policy, Regulation and Communities branch to the second tier within the organisation. This move would raise the profile of the OEC and make it directly accountable to the Minister for Ethnic Communities.
- Conduct an independent review into the Office of Ethnic Communities and its appointments processes for the Directors position since 2012, allegations of bullying and harassment by former staff, its failure to act on concerns raised by the Muslim community and their leadership role in the social inclusion work they were designated to lead in 2017 by the State Services Commission.
- Ensure that the future Ministry for Superdiversity hires qualified, able, and representative staff with relations, accountability, and mana within Aotearoa’s superdiverse communities, and is adequately resourced.



## LEGISLATIVE

### Criminalise Hate Speech

- The Terms of Reference specify that the recommendations sought must be consistent with maintaining New Zealand as a free and democratic society. There is an understandable worry about infringing on free speech and other important rights and freedoms. FIANZ shares that worry especially in relation to religious freedoms.
- The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 states that rights and freedoms may be subject to “such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society”.
- It is possible to identify and justify the lower limit of permissible speech in a free and democratic society. The line is drawn at speech that is intended to be harmful or to incite harm (physical or psychological), or to propagate hatred.
- As the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination’s concluding observations on the combined twenty-first and twenty-second periodic reports of New Zealand notes with concern, the most recent successful prosecution for hate speech was in the 1970s. While the lower limit for permissible speech in a free and democratic society should be set high, the lack of prosecutions suggests that the lower limit is currently too high.
- The Human Rights Act 1993 s61(1), makes unlawful “speech which is threatening, abusive, or insulting, or to broadcast by means of radio or television or other electronic communication words which are threatening, abusive, or insulting”. However, the Human Rights Act s61(1) relates to racial disharmony, but not religious intolerance and hatred. This must be amended.
- Enact and enforce hate crimes legislation. The New Zealand Law Commission must review the adequacy of existing legislation and consider the proposal that hate crimes should be established as a separate category of offence rather than an “aggravating factor” in sentencing.
- This should include acts of hatred that target people (individuals and groups), property (including places of worship and minority-owned businesses), and religious symbols (including Halal and Kosher).
- FIANZ believes that it is important for Halal and Kosher to be legally protected in New Zealand as symbols of religious identity that are often the targets of verbal and physical hate attacks. This may require legislation in addition to hate crimes legislation to protect Halal and Kosher dietary requirements, to ensure food security for New Zealand Muslims and Jews.
- Criminalise groups and organisations that promote, incite, or perform acts of racial or religious discrimination, hatred, or violence, and participation in such groups or organisations.



## LEGISLATIVE

- Register hate crimes and record statistics on the perpetrators and victims of crime to build an accurate record of racial- religious- and gender-based violence, including where these intersect (for example, white male physical assault against black Muslim female).
- Clarify referent objects in official speech in line with legislation. Official speech must be clear that it is not just white bodies and Pākehā identity and values that are being secured, and that Muslims and Islam are not demographic, normative, or ontological threats.
- Stop the abuse of social media by extremists.
- FIANZ strongly supports the Government's championing of the global governance of the internet and the "Christchurch Call" to provide a regulatory framework to stop the spread of terrorist and extremist content online.
- FIANZ supports Spark's view that Government should establish a "robust policy framework to address the important issues surrounding such material being distributed online and freely available".
- FIANZ supports the Helen Clark Foundation's recommendation to establish an independent regulatory body in New Zealand for social media companies, and to subject social media companies to a statutory duty of care to ensure the reasonable safety of their users, and that they take reasonable measures, including technological means, to prevent, or reduce the risk of, users harming themselves or others.

### Weapons

- Recommendations involve the administration of firearms legislation, and are thus within the scope of the Royal Commission's terms of reference.
- Strengthen the firearms licensing vetting process.
- Strengthen the regulatory regime for gun clubs and ranges, including obligations on operators to report suspicious behaviour to Police.

### Racism

- Establish an inquiry into effective anti-racism legislation including consultation with all stakeholders including minority groups.
- As Paul Hunt, Chief Human Rights Commissioner, stated after the Christchurch terrorist attack, our country must "become a global champion of anti-racism, anti-Islamophobia and human rights".
- Frame the legislation in the global historical context of imperialism, colonialism, slavery, and genocide, and the national historical context of settler colonialism.



## LEGISLATIVE

### Nationhood

- Set and enforce minimum standards of ethical integrity, professional conduct, and democratic discourse across all agencies and levels of government.
- Demagoguery degenerates democracy, creating polarisation and instability. FIANZ believes that setting and enforcing minimum standards for public officials and candidates for public office is demonstrably justified for the maintenance of a free and democratic society against forces of polarisation and instability.
- Public officials (elected or appointed) and candidates for public office in an established democracy should be expected to model the highest standards of ethical integrity, professional conduct, and democratic public reason, so setting and enforcing minimum standards is reasonable.

### Therefore, FIANZ proposes amendments to:

- i) The Cabinet Manual to prohibit racial and religious discrimination in relation to the Conduct of Ministers.
- ii) The Standing Orders of the House of Representatives to create a mechanism for censuring Members whose speech constitutes racial or religious discrimination below the lower limit of democratic discourse on matters such as immigration, international relations, trade, foreign investment, and security and intelligence.
- iii) The State Services Commission's Code of Conduct for the State Services to prohibit racial and religious discrimination in relation to Standards of Integrity and Conduct.
- iv) The Local Government Act 2002 to mandate that local authorities prohibit racial and religious discrimination in their Code of Conduct.
- v) The Electoral Act 1993 to make campaigning on a platform of racial or religious discrimination, intolerance, or hatred, including calls for deportation ("remigration", "repatriation", "go home"); internment; violence; genocide; social exclusion; revoking New Zealand citizenship or revoking the full and equal rights of citizenship; a disqualifying offence (in addition to any other criminal offence). Complaints would be referred by interested parties to the Electoral Commission, who would determine whether the disqualifying offence had been committed, and this decision could be appealed in court.



## EDUCATION

- Provide free and accessible tailored self-defence classes for women and girls across Aotearoa New Zealand to combat gendered and racialised violence and harassment..
- Places of worship and religious holidays must be made referent objects.
- Avoid the explicit securitisation of Islam in speech, particularly inaccurate phrases such as “radical Islam”, “Muslim extremism”, or “Islamic terrorist”. Accurate terms include “Islamist extremism”, “Islamist extremist terrorism”, and “Islamist extremist terrorist”, “right wing extremism”, “right wing extremist terrorism”, and “right wing extremist terrorism” and so on following the pattern – “environmentalist extremism”, “anti-1080 extremist terrorism”, and “left wing extremist terrorist”, etc.
- These standardised terms also permit standardised abbreviations, e.g. “IE”, “RWE”, “LWE”, “EE”, “A1080E”, etc.
- Where possible, the names of specific organisations or networks should be used to identify the variety of extremism or the nature of the terrorist attack., e.g. “The Daesh terrorist”, “The terrorist with suspected links to the Atomwaffen Division”, or “The Nordkreuz terrorist attack”.
- Normalise Islam and Muslims in official and popular discourse. This will also involve media in New Zealand making a conscious effort to normalise Muslim representations on screen, and to take a critical, rational, and ethical approach to priming and framing stories involving Islam, Muslims, and Muslim-majority countries and regions.
- Counter the radicalisation of RWEs and design deradicalisation programmes for our local social, historical, and geographical context.
- Reintegrate RWEs into mainstream society through educational and vocational opportunities and social activities that help RWEs to learn about what it is to be a New Zealander in the 21st century, and to learn the history and foundations of contemporary New Zealand society and government.
- Counter RWE narratives.
  - i) This will involve targeted interventions to enable RWEs to think critically about whiteness, masculinity, nationalism, global history, world religions and civilisations, and the meaning of “the West”.
  - ii) Conspiracy theories are integral to extremist narratives, so targeted interventions must be based on the psychology and epistemology of conspiracy theories, paranoid thinking, and belief revision.
  - iii) Provide better interpretations of, and explanations for, the complex regional and global transformations and events that are causing disorientation, destabilisation, alienation, and polarisation. Start with these experiences and the motive of searching for truth and justice, problematise simplistic or implausible interpretations or explanations, and present more enlightening perspectives and accounts.



## EDUCATION

**iv)** Use mainstream conservative, liberal, and socialist political philosophy and mainstream religion to suggest alternative ways of understanding the world and developing their personal beliefs, ethics, and aesthetics.

- Discredit RWE leaders, movements, beliefs, ethics, and aesthetics.
- Partner with faith, cultural, iwi, and community stakeholders to design and implement the programme and strengthen protective factors (identity, place, belonging, aspiration, social connections, etc.).
- Facilitate an inclusive and enabling environment in which youth from different ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious backgrounds are recognised and provided with support to design and implement programmes to promote peace, social cohesion, justice, and development, in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 2250 (2015) on Youth, Peace and Security.
- Develop programmes with community input to reduce all forms of bullying and discrimination in schools, including racial and religious bullying and discrimination.
- The Education Review Office notes that our school roll is more ethnically diverse than Aotearoa New Zealand's general population.
- The Children's Commissioner report, *Education Matters to Me: Key Insights* (2018) offered six key insights from their analysis of what tamariki and rangatīhi are saying.
- The first is that children and young people "want to be seen for who they are, and to be understood within the context of their home life and experiences".
- The second is that many children and young people "experience racism at school and are treated unequally because of their culture".
- Many children and young people responded to an open-ended question on what they would change about their school that they would end bullying and racism and ensure the emotional safety of students. This resonates with what Muslim children, young people, and their parents and elder siblings have been saying across the country.
- The Ministry of Education must develop a comprehensive plan and monitoring and reporting processes in consultation with tamariki, rangatāhi, and whānau, iwi leaders, the Children's Commissioner, Human Rights Foundation, FIANZ, IWCNZ, and other stakeholders representing Aotearoa's superdiversity.
- A focus must also be placed on identifying, re-socialising, and re-educating children and youth who exhibit racist behaviours and warning signs of radicalisation.
- Call on religious leaders to continually denounce and delegitimise all forms of extremism, racism, xenophobia, and related intolerance in line with the United Nations Durban Declaration s.211. Leaders should feel compelled as morally upright people, defenders of faith, and as New Zealanders to spread the universal message of "peace, human dignity, and the sanctity of life".



## EDUCATION

- Intervene in the information ecosystem, to inform domestic, regional, and global publics, and counter disinformation and misinformation during our age of uncertainty and change.
- Campaign for media literacy and critical thinking to combat the rise of fake news and the viral spread of misinformation and disinformation, including information warfare by hostile state and non-state actors.
- Develop nationwide education and professional development programmes to celebrate Aotearoa NZ's diversity.
- Fund social scientific and psychological research on spiritual wellbeing and the protective factors of religion and community, including in the context of counter-terrorism and resilience after a terrorist attack.
- Fund social scientific and psychological research on racism, Islamophobia, right wing extremism, white supremacy, security perceptions and narratives, national identity, and inter-communal hatred, conflict, and dialogue.
- Fund social scientific and psychological research on the determinants of minority mental health and wellbeing.
- Create undergraduate and postgraduate scholarships for Māori, Muslim, and other superdiverse students to enter the mental and allied health professions.
- Encourage professional societies for psychiatry, psychology, counselling, and related therapeutic practices to increase their mentoring and support for Māori, Muslim, and other superdiverse practitioners, and combat any racial and gender discrimination, bullying, and harassment in the sector.
- Provide psychological support for individuals radicalised by RWE ideology to develop stable identities, unlearn biases and group-based misrecognitions, manage violent tendencies, and reintegrate into mainstream society.
- Publish high quality and updated guides and resources for the public and private sectors focussed on multicultural and multifaith equity and inclusion.
- Produce a reference guide to New Zealand's superdiverse communities by working closely with faith-based organisations and key stakeholders in our superdiverse communities. This should be updated every five years.
- Hosting by the Ministry for Superdiversity of interfaith and multicultural events and create opportunities for dialogue, particularly through culture and sport. Develop nationwide education and professional development programmes to celebrate Aotearoa NZ's diversity.
- Build Aotearoa New Zealand's locally contextualised knowledge base in security studies, international relations, global political economy, global historical sociology, global history, and global political theory.





## EDUCATION

- Hold a major conference and commission an interdisciplinary collection of critical essays on New Zealand identity and security post-Christchurch, and continue to convene on topics of identity and security in our changing world.
- Establish scholarships for the postgraduate study of RWE and non-traditional security threats, which, like the GCSB's women in STEM scholarships, will also have the effect of diversifying the recruitment pool and bring new perspectives, insights, and approaches to the NZIC, NZDF, and MFAT.
- c) Create a world-leading interdisciplinary research unit for the study and prevention of RWE involving academia, civil society, and Government.



POLICE EMERGENCY POLICE EMERGENCY POLICE EMERGENCY



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